Canguilhem, “From the Social the Vital” (from 2nd edition of The Normal and the Pathological)

 

 

The abnormal as logically second but historically first (243).  Is the logical point a more a priori point or is it meant to be born out by the historical examples that follow on the next few pages?

 

Canguilhem broaches the differences between normalization and standardization, norms and standards, (e.g., 246), but we could interrogate this.

 

The normative has “its beginning… in its infraction” (242).  What is the relationship between the infraction and the norm?  And what is the relationship that then follows between the norm and the process of regulation that serves to reinforce the norm?

 

The brief historical epistemology that GC offers on 244-245.  Where do we see GC anticipating Foucault and where do we see Foucault doing something particularly different than what is anticpated?

 

Why is normalization for GC expressed in terms of “the polar opposition of a positive and a negative” (240) and logical negation (243)?

To what extent does GC disarticulate this conception of opposition and negation escape the idea of contradiction?

 

How do different forms of regulation and norms interact for GC?  How is the social normalization related to technological and to biological?  (See 255 for example.)  What kinds of things are “social” and “technological” and “juridical”?

 

How are organic and social norms differentiated by GC?  He offers an idea of reflexivity or normative autonomy (256), in contrast to the unity of an organic whole.  Does this sufficiently establish the distinction he wants?

 

If the normal gets naturalized through institutions (237), then how does this, how do these institutions, relate to the “unity” of “organization” that GC discusses later in the piece (250)?

 

To what extent can normalization be regarded as specific to modern forms of rationality?  What is GC’s conception of how this comes about?  Is it more about social modernity?  Or evolution?

 

 

 

We then began with discussion:

Dialectic in the CGC.  Is he thinking a notion of opposition without contradiction?  That is a notion of opposition, or dialectical relationship, by way of a non-contradictory negativity.

Canguilhem’s “two teams”: contradiction and externality (A), versus inversion, polarity, opposition (240), negation (243), infraction (242)?

 

Four metaphilosohpical options briefly sketched:

               Contradiction (GWFH): the norm exists and then gets contradicted; contradiction is the motor.

               Negation (GWFH): negativity/difference is contained within every rule/rationality

Negation (GC): difference/negativity comes first, and then later comes the rule/norm, and then from that comes the abnormal.

               Difference (GD): difference comes first, and out of that comes the rule/norm.

 

Are the rules for GC more like Kantian rules in that they are conditions or procedures for unity of judgment?  Or are they more like rules of practice?

 

At this point many more interesting things were said, but we didn't get them down in notes.

 

One interesting thing concerned the relationship between the first half of the piece (metaphilosophy, metaphysics, philosophy) and the second half of the piece (a historical epistemology).  What is their relation?  Does part 2 follow form part 1?  Is part 2 what you h ave to do given the argument that GC lands on in part 1?