Critical Genealogies Collaboratory
Thursday, November 12, 2026
Foucault, The Punitive Society, lectures 1 and 13
Thursday, October 29, 2026
Nietzsche, GM.II selections (esp. GM.II.12)
The group began as per usual with questions:
There were many questions about section 12:
How does Nietzsche arrive at the idea that processes of domination tied to reinterpretation? What is his method for getting there?
How do we understand the relationship between Ntz’s broader claims and his discussion of important? (Sect 12 and sect 13)
Is Nietzsche’s historical method metaphysically comprehensive enough to do any meaningful explanatory work?
How do we parse out the following ideas in Nietzsche’s genealogy: utility, origin, emergence, functional meaning, evolution.
How do the following three ideas hang together:
A) Emergence differs from Usefulness
B) Everything consists of Domination/Overpowering
C) Every domination is an Interpretation
The group then moved to discussion:
We can distinguish three claims:
A) A) Origin/Emergence not equal to Usefulness/Utility/Purpose (to what extent is purpose/useful intentional?)
B) B) Everything that occurs consists of Overpowering/Dominating
C) C) Every Dominating consists of Reinterpretation
What is the relationship between (A) on the one hand and (B) and (C)? How do we get from (A) to (B)? How do we get from (B) to (C)? Or does (A) itself follow from (B) and (C)?
These three claims refer to three ideas:
A) A) Origin≠Purpose
B) B) Power
C) C) Meaning
As an example of (C), Nietzsche discusses in Section 13 the multiple meanings of punishment. These multiple meanings analytically breaks apart “a kind of unity” of meaning (13).
On our reading, (B) involves (C). And from (B) and (C) together (A) follows. If (B) and (C) hold, then the negation of (A) (i.e., that purpose is determined by punishment) cannot be true. The idea seems to be that (B) (presumably somehow together with (C)) destabilizes any purpose built in to origin.
(A) is the conclusion of the argument.
(B) is the main premise.
(C) is an additional premise (though it is not clear why this is essential to the argument).
To explain this reading...
Nietzsche’s view is that (B) happens; that is (B) is always set to happen. (B) requires a power differential. This is not metaphysical, but naturalistic. (Or is it metaphysical?)
Then what is the relation between (B) and (C)? Does (B) follow from (C)? Or is (C) just be (B)?
By overpowering, a meaning is imposed. The overpowering is the meaning-making. The overpowering (plus the resistance).
The overpowering “consists of” (rather than “entails”) re-interpretation.
The overpowering, such that it can be reinterpreted, has to be exacted by that which lives. Is it that which lives? Or is that which is intentional?
Not likely that intentionality is a requirement for Nietzsche, because he uses an example the exaptation of a ‘physiological organ’.
Ntz draws the line between the vital and the nonvital, rather than between the intentionally vital and the non-intentionally vital.
But this raises a problem for how meaning changes, for how (B) leads to (C) in the sense of reinterpretation of meaning.
But where does the reinterpretation come from? Why is it the meaning? Is meaning [Sinn] itself organic?
So meaning here happens not at the level of linguistic intentionality, but rather at the level of power.
Meaning as Sinn not necessarily linguistic meaning.
There is a methodological problem raised by all of this that we discussed:
If the practice’s purposes/uses changes, then what is the continuity of the form? Why not just call them different practices?
What would be Ntz’s methodology for tracking this? Is it philology?
Nietzsche is clear that the procedure (Prozedur) is independent from the purpose/utility. This raises a methodological problem.
The methodological question is how we would track a procedure as the same? In what does continuity of procedure consist such that we can track it?
What are the methodological options we have for establishing continuity?
Continuity through functional use (Nietzsche rejects this; is arguing against this)
Continuity through linguistic resemblance
Continuity through morphological resemblance
Continuity through descent (hypothesized)
Continuity through descent (causal-empirical)
In discussion we came to the tentative conclusion that continuity is established through descent. This is a naturalistic-causal process for Nietzsche. In the best cases it can be studied/established empirically.
Nietzsche then concludes that punishment does many things (13). Therefore punishment does not have just the one supposed benefit of inducing guilt (14). In fact punishment makes people harder and less guilty (14).
Thursday, October 22, 2026
Marx's Capital, vol.1, sec. 3-4 of ch. 25 & selections from Cohen's Marx's Theory of History
Questions
1. What is constant and variable capital? What is meant by organic constitution?
2. How does Cohen's account of functional explanation address Marx's claim that it is (historical) periodicity (p. 786) that creates the law-like necessity of capital's reproduction?
3. Is Cohen doing a necessary reconstruction of Marx's account of causality with his functional explanation?
4. Cohen claims Marx's identifies "two reasons for the contraction of the working day effected by the Factory Acts" (p. 294), but it seems that Marx's chapter of the working day has more than two (it is multilayered). How do we address this?
5. Does the industrial reserve army functions as a unifying mechanism? Or does it group different population whose unity as a functional mechanism requires further explanation?
6. What is the logic of Cohen's account of functional explanation in Marxism? Under what conditions does Cohen's interpretation makes sense? Does it make Marxist analysis useful, attractive, etc.? Under what conditions does it not? We can use the industrial reserve army as the example to address this.
7. How does this account of functional explanation differ or contrast from Durkheim's?
8. Is antagonism the/a function of the general laws of capitalism or is it the effect of various interests caused by (the laws of) capital?
Thursday, October 15, 2026
Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), Ch. 3 and Ch. 5
October 15th, 2026
Questions
(119): to demonstrate the utility….do not create it.” Is Durkheim dichotomizing origins from purpose? And, given pg. 124, so what is this new distinction between usefulness and origins? So which is the real Durkheim? Function/utility vs. origin/cause
(124): “If it lacks utility…return.” What would be some examples of social facts that have continued to have utility versus one that no longer has utility but has persisted?
For Durkheim what kind of explanatory work can function do? What would make utility genuinely explanatory of persistence rather than merely correlated with it?
(124-125): Seems as though survival overlaps with harmony. Is harmony something presupposed here? Is it a principle? Is it inferred? Esp. compared to a Darwinian account of evolution.
(104): Durkheim analogizes the role of the statesman to the doctor. If we want to pursue the intersection of sociology and social philosophy, ought we emulate the doctor?
What is a collective sentiment?
(99): Individual v. common consciousness: What is common consciousness? Common goal? Are there things common amongst people? How does this common consciousness influence the individual?
Is “function” a normative concept or descriptive? Clarify relationship between descriptive and normative.
Discussion:
Beginning with social theory question (#8), what is the standard reading of Durkheim?
Must be descriptive, but doesn't the language of pathology imply a normative failing?
May help to place Durkheim on a spectrum, where Parsons is more functionalist. Yes, D is interested in utility and function, but he doesn’t think everything is working as it “should” or functioning “correctly”
Functional theory v. conflict theory
Clearly, D doesn’t want to be teleological, but nevertheless there is a presumption of something harmonious. So, he is definitely in some sense interested in preservation of social life.
Related to the question of disciplinary boundaries, p.104.
When D says he wants to maintain a sense of the norm as externally imposed (104), is D trying to get away from normativity?
Seems that function has an evaluative connotation. So clearly functions are dynamic
But Durkheim does seem to want to establish some objective normativity, especially in judging or deciding what to do given facts
Example of crime. Given that D disagrees with Comte and Spencer, Durkheim is using crime or criminality to draw distinctions and rethink the place of punishment.
Society is not, for Durkheim, the sum of its individual parts (individualism or individual consciousnesses). Societal nature cannot be reduced to human nature (organism)
Wonder if there is an analogy here, that when scientists or biologists explain organisms in terms of equilibrium, then sociology somehow needs to understand harmony/equilibrium as a principle of the social system. Further question: is equilibrium or social stability a minimum principle or presupposition or is it actually more complicated? I.e.: does society tend toward its function, equilibrium?
Durkheim is still trying to address anomy and societal war or struggle. Has a commitment to understand why or how social forces create society to collapse
Okay so what is an example of something whose function has been lost but its social fact does not exist.
On 124, Durkheim seems to be making a strong claim, that if something is not useful, its actually harmful. Insofar as our appendices are not useful, they are harmful. What is a social version of this?
Definition of utility, something that contributes to social persistence, harmony.
If something disturbs the normal operation of social functions (90).
Efficient cause is one thing, function is something else (123),
Causation and function, keep these separate. But persistence and utility, these are the same, or persistence and origin.
Durkheim is not explaining history, he’s explaining persistence (not origination).
Forward looking-backward looking question about method: page 135.
Causality without origination? Causality of persistence vs Causality of origin?
Thursday, October 1, 2026
Fall '26 Revised Reading Plan
Listed by week number of term followed by reading:
3. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), Ch. 3 and Ch. 5 selections [~23 pages below]
- Ch. 3 pages: 97-104 (plus optional: 86-87, 94-97)
- Ch. 5 pages: 119-125, 127-129, 134-138, 142-144
- Recommended: Durkheim, "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (1900) [~25 pages]
4. Marx, Capital, volume 1 (1867), pp. 781-794 (Section 3 of Ch. 25 on capital accumulation: surplus population and the reserve army of the unemployed)
- Cohen (on Marx), Karl Marx's Theory of History, pp. 278-280, 293-296
- Recommended: Marx, Capital, other selections TBD
5. Nietzsche, GM (1887), II.12 (and other sections of GM to be announced)
Then, with some methodological questions in view, we start on Foucault:
6. Foucault, Punitive Society (1973), Lecture one (3 Jan) (incl. the notes on pg. 14) [meet without CK]
7. Foucault, Punitive Society (1973), Lecture thirteen (28 Mar)
8. Foucault, D&P (1975), I.1 (pp. 3-24), III.3 (pp. 195-216), plus other selections
9. No meeting due to holiday
10. Foucault, "SMBD" (1976), selections on civil war from Lectures 1-3 (or all three lectures in turn)
11 (tbd). Foucault, HSv1/WtK/VdS (1976), selections on method, read IV.1 (Objective) and IV. 2 (Method); focus will be on postulates on power (p. 94ff.) and methodological rules (p. 98ff.), plus remind me to distribute a table tracking Foucault's transforming conception of the power across writings in the 1970s.
Wednesday, June 3, 2026
Marx, Capital Ch. 10 “The Working Day” sections 5-6
Questions:
Given that Marx helps himself to interviews, reports, etc., (i.e. seems to use an archival/historical method) how can we understand what he means by “abstraction?”
(p377): M seems to conceptualize slave labor as capital, so is there a way to conceptualize slave labor as both labor and capital?
(p381): What is the referent of society here such that there can be a distinction between society and capital?
Why is this put in terms of the number of working hours instead of wage? Empirical question: were wages not paid hourly at the time, such that this would not have been thought about by Marx? Is this better read as an actual account or a historical exemplar of how surplus value is extracted; does analysis still hold for surplus extraction today?
(375, 390): What does Marx mean by “moral” and “morality” in these chapters?
On the self-valorization of capital/ attempt to extend the working day, yet attempt to keep the day as normal as possible to replenish the worker. Is Marx claiming, with this tension, that there is an irrationality to capitalism?
Why is Marx going into this history of labor law? What does it add to his account?
Discussion:
[Q7] Also a question about Marx’s method. Could be moving, as Marx suggests elsewhere, a movement from the abstract to the concrete.
So, what do we make of the transition between the two, then?
The passing of laws surrounding working days perhaps points to the way in which struggle is necessary for the overcoming of capital.
If this is supposed to be an account of conflict internal to capitalism, then, how do we move from this internal conflict to a disruption of the entire system?
A difference in how we can read Marx: either as overcoming capitalism is inevitable, or reading him as not holding this as an inevitability (contingent on working class organization).
Still, Marx never seems to transcend this legal conflict in his analysis.
Similar to how increased wages may improve something to an extent, but the logic remains intact.
C.p. reformist projects
And actually, increasing a wage can benefit capital through the increased replenishment of the working class. (p. 375 “foolishness!”)
[Q6] On page 377, “It would seem therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a normal working day.”
Marx points out that an excess population in reserve as slave labor, then there is less impetus to improve the life of a laborer.
Question emerges about the purpose of this section. Is Marx making a claim about class antagonism.
Perhaps you cannot conceptualize surplus value without thinking the working day, and vice versa.
Is Marx, then, trying to highlight the inevitability of class antagonism under capitalism, or exploitation from which antagonism develops?
By turning to the laws, it’s clear that legal protections aren’t generated out of the benevolence of legality, but are produced through class antagonisms.
Still unclear about what Marx is trying to establish…
[Q4]: Moves us to the question about why the unit of measurement is the working day as opposed to the wage or salary?
Can’t it be both? That Marx is equating these measures, or translating them such that the working day as measured in hours, labor power of the work, are all commensurate in the struggle between the wage earner and the capitalist, which stabilizes.
Given that the technique of Marx’s analysis has changed, and the working day looks fundamentally different today, is Marx trying to ground his analysis of exploitation in the empirical and historical technique? Or is he trying to suggest that exploitation persists regardless of the technique?
As GEs, we’re not exactly coal miners. So what about Marx’s account could contemporary examples of labor fit into? Is it the account of class antagonism? What are the qualities of the “stuff” that is immutable? Technology is different, so are finances, so what allows us to see what the theoretical “core” is that discloses contemporary exploitation?
Immutable laws that Marx seems to be trying to explain are “class antagonism” and “extraction of surplus value”
Is this capitalism or is this something worse? By what criterion would we suggest that this is still capitalism?
But what about situations where class antagonism persists, but there isn’t extraction of surplus value?
Clearly, a lot of these conditions (blood of children) have been ameliorated, so on what does the critique rely on today?
Okay, so if we still want to say that capitalism persists in its amoral mode, then there must be something that makes the present a capitalist one even if we don’t have the same empirical atrocities.
Wednesday, May 20, 2026
Marx, Capital Ch. 7 The Labour Process and the Valorization Process
Questions
1. Relationship between the worker, the process, and the object (p. 287)
2. Valorization [verwertet] - what work is this concept doing? (p. 303)
3. Why is temporality the framing for labour? Is it historical? Why not explain in terms of compensation rather than length of the work day?
4. Does enslaved labor produce value? Is the 'value' of enslaved labour the socially average necessary labour-time to produce an enslaved worker? (p. 303)
5. Distinction between creating value and valorization (p. 302)
6. What is Marx's relationship to humanism, i.e., the commitment to the distinctness of the human as "tool-making animal" (p. 286) or as the labouring animal (p. 283)?
7. Marx writes: "Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature" (p. 283). What is the limit to the plasticity, malleability, perfectability, etc. of human nature?
Discussion
- Two senses of instrument on (p. 285) - both hand instrument and the entire world as resource [Q6 and Q7]
- Some animals minimally use instruments
- Franklin's conception of tool-making; Bergson later treats it as making tools to make tools and so on
- Bees and spiders act on instict rather than having concepts or ideas of tools
- When is labour present? - Reaching for the apple is labour; does the body become an instrument
- Bodily organs become instruments on p. 28
- Is breathing labouring? Do the lungs become instruments?
- They change nature into a resource
- "Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. H e sets i n motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature." (p. 283)
- Metabolism as biological
- But given bee/spider examples, it cannot be instinctual or involuntary (?)
- Biological underdetermination (from Soren Mau) - some biological elements but also socially malleable
- Co-determination of instruments/technology and society/humanity
- But environment still becomes instruments or resources
- The difference between humans and bees is that humans are conscious of our use of tools/materials (p. 284)
- The kick-back transforms our nature - therefore, still some tech determinism
- Or in communism, we have full control over kick-back, we would control the effects to purposefully transform ourselves
- Intention in labour "Man's activity, via the instruments of labour, effects an alteration in the object of labour which was intended from the outset." (p. 287)
- What about "unrest" in the worker affecting the object of labour? (p. 287) [Q1]
- "During the labour process, the worker's labour constantly un der goes a transformation, from the form of unrest [Unruhe] into that of being [Sein], from the form of motion [Bewegung] into that of objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit]." (p. 296)
- Instrumentalism without technological determinism (?)
- Not some inexorable technological determinism which undermines agency
- But still some instrumentalism without being "straight-line instrumentalism" (see Ihde/Winner)
- Maybe not a coherent view - but less deterministic than the fragment on machines
- Technological change does not separate us from our true selves - no alienation from a species-being; now, our nature changes with technology
- Does the alienation critique hold?
- Alienation from the products of labour in Capital
- But less normative force than the EPM position that one experiences alienation from oneself or one's species-being
- Difference of value and valorization [Q2 & Q5]
- "Our capitalist has two objectives: in the first place, he wants to produce a use-value which has exchange-value, i.e. an article destined to be sold, a commodity; and secondly he wants to produce a commodity greater in value than the sum of the values of the commodities used to produce it, namely the means of production and the labour-power he purchased with his good money on the open market. His aim is to produce not only a use-value, but a commodity; not only use-value, but value; and not just value, but also surplus-value." (p. 293).
- "The road to hell is paved with good intentions, and he might just as well have intended to make money without producing at all." (p. 299)
- Look back to p. 36 for a definition
- "The formula ' capital value in search of additional value' is now understood as capital organizing a process of self-valorization ( Verwertung), a process of constant searching for increases in its own value through the unity of the, labour process and the process of production of in creased value."
- Constant process of investment and wealth-generation
- While pre-capitalist wealth was held - idle class versus capitalist class
- More than the extraction of surplus-value (?)
- Distinction of value versus valorization
- "If we now compare the process of creating value with the process of valorization, we see that the latter is nothing but the con tinuation of the former beyond a definite point. If the process is not carried beyond the point where the value paid by the capitalist for the labour-power is replaced by an exact equivalent, it is simply a process of creating value ; but if it is continued beyond that point, it becomes a process of valorization." (p. 302)
- So is it profit/surplus value (?)
- Is valorization profit-making or reinvestment of profit?
- Difference between production process and capitalist produciton process (p. 304)
- Capitalism is different from making use-values, its about the value exceeding what it should be when you consider the average socially necessary labour time
- Temporality as part of Marx's theory or an artifact of 19th century philosophy [Q3]
- But it has to be temporal because it comes from the average socially necessary labour-time
- Wage is just an expression of the value as labour-time
- Marx has indexed value to come from labour-time. So, wages would be an expression of this value
- Labour power sold for a period or time - exchange of time for money