Questions
1. What does "function" mean? Consider: "In order to make rights and laws function according to pure theory, the jurists place themselves in imagination in the state of nature" (p. 199); and "In short, [the panoptic mechanism] arranges special arrangements..." (p. 200). It seems that the function is more in the surface than puissance/pouvoir and that is doesn't have a goal. Is "function" a relation between practices?
2. What is the relation between "possible positive effects" and "complex social function" (p. 23)?
3. What does he mean by a "generalized function" (p. 207)? Foucault distinguishes it from a hinge, a point of exchange by saying it is "a way of making power relations function in a function, and of making a function function through these power relations" (pp. 206-207)...
4. Panoptic institution, machine, schema, etc. how do these concepts relate to the concept of function (p. 207)?
5. Foucault describes the transition between sovereign power and disciplinary power as one in which the spectacle gives was to a "a new character." This is also described as a transition of genre or style from "a certain kind of tragedy" to the beginning of "a comedy" (pp. 16-17)? Why is that? Could this be interpreted in light of (or help us understand) the conception of "function"?
6. Contrasting two triads: "general functions," "different roles exercised by penalties," and "penal tactics" [Punitive Society]; "penal procedures," "social functional form," and "power" [Discipline and Punish, p. 23].
7. Could we unpack the "4 general rules" (p. 23) for Foucault's study?
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Discussion
Foucault describes this as a "a correlative history of the modern soul" by contrasting it with an exclusive focus on "the evolution of legislation or of penal procedures" and Durkheim's "study of "the general social forms" (p. 23). He seems to be questioning the narrative that it is "the individual" (and his dignity) what prompts the humanization of the law and punishment. Instead, it is the individual what is produced. It is the effect in the changes in the techniques of power-knowledge. As his positive view, he includes his 4 general rules.
Foucault notes a "common matrix" or an "epistemological-juridical formation" connects, relates, or somehow links both the history of penal law and the history of the human sciences. This notion of "common matrix" appeals to an attempt to craft or open up a field or space of inquiry...
History of punishment can be narrated as a history of moral ideas or legal structures but Foucault wants to provide a "history of the body" and its political economy (p. 25). It is difficult to understand what Foucault means by "body"... is it body-subject (politics), body-object (science), both? And it seems that the same techniques are used in both scientific inquiry and political institutions of coercion.
Foucault's argument here is complex because he simultaneously uses "body" as a methodological category of analysis (such as power-knowledge) but also as a content of the field of analysis.
His rules are ways in which to show penal leniency as power instead of a natural effect of the acknowledgement of humanity (p. 24). The appearance of humanity should be interrogates instead of assumed (this is his Nietzschean suspicion).