Thursday, October 20, 2022

1974 CdF Psychiatric Pwr, Ch. 9, pp. 201-223

Questions and points to discus:

1. When Foucault talks about how the idiot has no past, can we read this colonially? Linked to a question of education and assimilation

2. Notion of the will? Relation of idiot and will – its relation to Kantian morality? (p. 215)

3. Idea of psychiatric power as tautological? (p. 218-19)


Discussion: 

A kind of confrontation of wills between patient and doctor

- Discussion of Seguin:

- Will as ordering of instincts

- Kant identifies skepticism as anarchism and dogmatism as totalizing 

- A movement contrary to Kant – a will not to be organized/subsumed

- A will refusing to assemble itself as autonomous 

- Psychiatric power emerged because of children – to understand them, not children

- Madness for adults; idiocy for children

- The figures Foucault cites are interested in the movement from childhood to adulthood

- Difficulty of distinguishing between Foucault’s voice and the voice of those he cites 

- Draw out the power dynamic through a comparative of the psychiatrist and the teacher

- Surplus power (p. 216)

- The body as a site of power/surplus

- Relates to two weeks ago and the body and surplus of power “Punitive Society” 

- Extractive/creation of docility to manage surplus (to return in discussion of D&P)

- Not yet about education/what we would refer to as that; the problem that needs to be solved is how to make sure that parents could be freed from care work; we don’t get contrasts between different kinds of education

- Insititution of certain classes of children and the function of education as geared towards moral treatment (akin to the asylum)

- Prison/school/asylum as institutions of moral treatment 

- The goal is not to create autonomous people, it seems more to be securing yes to authority; development of obedience to external authority 

- Double movement between school and psychiatric power

- 218-219 relation of the school and the asylum 

- repetition of the phrase “supplement of power” 

- Moral treatment as norming 

- What accounts Foucault goes to (first-person accounts, reports, etc.) 

- The possible link between Foucault and Piaget and the question of development/assuming a paradigm in the process of normalization and psychoanalysis (topics at beginning and end of lecture) 

- Fear of what the “will to not will” represents 


Thursday, October 13, 2022

1973 Rio lectures, "Truth and Juridical Forms," in Essential Works vol. 3, pp. 1-5, 52-67, 78-85

 

Questions and areas to discuss:

1.     If we can specify, for ourselves, this practice/technology/form called “examination (58-59); what does it look like? How does Foucault characterize it? Etc.

2.     Examination and the function of judicial power/the relationship between them

3.     A question of the person examining/the examiner

4.     Four functions of subjugation (82)

5.     Infra-legal (from last week) to infra-power (86)

6.     “Network of sequestration” and education/factory/hospitals – does that mean we need to look at these other aspects to say something of education/what are the implications of this concept for studying education? (80)

7.     How do people understand The subject of knowedge itself has a history; the relation of the subject to the object; or, more clearly, truth itself has a history” (2)? How can we make sense of that? Does anyone find this puzzling? If so, why?

 

Discussion:

-          Foucault and the distinction between Kant/Descartes

-          Q. 7: In the true – whether it can be considered true or false; Foucault says that in order for something to be deemed true/false, it must be considered in the true, a legible discourse. This kind of mechanism is what has the history.

o   In the context of him saying truth itself has a history, he is trying to steer clear of “academic Marxism”: the understanding of a universal, knowing subject on top of economic circumstances; instead, we change. We are not something that has always existed under an economic system.

§  How does this then relate to the truth changing/in the true changing?

§  P. 4: there are two kinds of history of truth “internal vs. external”

·       History of science (internal)

·       Other places where truth is formed, where a certain number of games are defined-games through which one sees certain forms of subjectivity, certain object domains, certain types of knowledge come into being-and that, consequently, one can on that basis construct an external, exterior history of truth.

o   What is it about truth itself that is the puzzling thing (in regards to having a history)?

o   There’s a recurring tension in Foucault by him taking what philosophers have done (by making the subject stable) and showing that there is a history of subjectivity itself/what counts as a subject/what counts as subjectivity and . Even in the former, there can be a skeptical critic accusing Foucault of playing with semantics: why is taking about this thing called subjectivity or this thing called truth instead of something else? Instead, you are talking about different kind of epiphenomenon within subjectivity changing.

§  It seems like the genealogist must be able to hold something steady when doing a history of subjectivity; this is not a history of random things or phenomenon

o   These other forms of subjectivity/power rest on truth

o   Critique of history truth as causing truth to lose essential connection, leading it to be a discussion not on truth but surrounding truth

o   Foucault claims to be writing a history of truth, not “the things that people call true”

o   “Thus, I would especially like to show how a certain knowledge of man was formed in the nineteenth century” (2)

-          (Q.6): If education is just one part of the network (including the factory and the hospital), then how do we study education as part of this network? Do we then have to study the connections before we can study education in particular?

o   It seems like there’s a move away from the notion of the sovereign; the network of seq. allows one to not think in terms of a state apparatus.

o   We could talk about how seq. functions as differently from exclusion. It seems like the idea is to attach people to a particular apparatus as a way of sequestering them away from other parts of society

o   “In the age we're concerned with, the aim of all these institutions, factories, schools, psychiatric hospitals, hospitals, prisons is not to exclude but, rather, to attach individuals. The factory doesn't exclude individuals: it attaches them to a production apparatus. The school doesn't exclude individuals, even in confming them: it fastens them to an apparatus of knowledge transmission” (78).

§  If we have these form of attachment, and they’re not excercized by the state… It’s easy to study when it originates from the State because it is one place. Whereas a seq. is more diffuse; it’s not clear what counts as a sufficient study of a diffusion. It seems like the rules/measure of success would be different for that method of inquiry

·       A shift of rules

o   It is not the State (shown through the contrast between England and France) (p. 79); Then there is a network and not purely state-based. Now we have three things in common to the factory, school and hospital: controlling bodies, modes of power, binding to production

§  Do we need to look at the network and then the node? Or can we focus on one, even if all of the studies have looked at them together?

o   Examinations function across network so how can you only study it in one mode

o   Perhaps there are multiple methods for inquiring into the network

o   The network itself creating another mode of inquiry, when thinking of inquiry as a technical term

§  When you study them as a network of seq. it becomes a different mode of inquiry, the intra-status

o   A term he’ll use for this problem is disposatif – multilayered elements that hang together; inter-institutional network

§  Different institutions of school, state, law; there is a network where they all hang together and study this network

o   He’s not doing an institutional history

§  So then, where is the level of analysis? Where is it happening?

·       Functions

o   Functions of controlling time (especially rigidly); the functions of controlling subjectivity that come from the seq. network; controlling time, controlling image of the body, through examination

·       If an institution has those formal qualities, they meet a certain criteria to be in this network of seq. and we can study them because they have met this criteria; being a part of a state is not a part of this functional criteria

·       If it meets certain functions it can be considered as a part of this network

§  If you have an institution, that sometimes/in some ways functions disciplinarily, but sometimes doesn’t (like the law or courts), then this is a way in which he is not studying an institutional history

·       Instead, connections can be drawn by the functional segmentation

§  He’s not holding this notion of institutional function (80)

·       One can distinguish between modern and feudal society through this method of inquiry into functions; it allows one to track historically…

§  What are other ways of what we’re calling functions? When we look forward to D&P we should pay attention to this

·       Some people think of Foucault as a materialist; we can then ask what the material expression of functions in Foucault?

§  82:  “The fIrst function is to extract time, by transforming people's time, their living time, into labor time. Its second function consists in converting people's bodies into labor power. The function of transforming the body into labor power corresponds to the function of transforming time into labor time. The third function of these institutions of subjugation consists in the creation of a new and peculiar type of power.”

o   How do we see Foucault/how could we see ourselves studying these things materially/non-ideally?

§  How does one study the rules, especially when they are not explicitly stated?

§  A methodological issue in virtue of what can we cross institutions; in an educational context, they might not state don’t drink alcohol, but the function won’t show up in the same language as it would in some other institutional context (such as a hospital); he's not tracking propositional synonyms, but he is tracking connections between them.

·       What is the thing through which the functions occur?

§  The panopticon as an example of a function; the diagram as a material object and the ways in which it cuts across these institutions; the panopticon as a diagram does that work

·       Panopticism (p. 58)

§  Empirical-transcendental

§  The panopticon as not having been put into practice, but Foucault focuses on the diagram itself; it doesn’t matter if it was put into practice but it can help us track functions of the institutions and this network

o   We can distinguish between a transcendental answer, a transcendental-empirical answer, and a radically empirical answer

§  To connect these different cross-institutional functions; we can track this same idea or rule (transcendental answer)

§  Diagram; they gain expression in different institutional contexts and the expressions look different but what’s spread across the network is the diagrammatic (empirical-transcendental answer)

§  The panopticon in action (radically empiricist) an empiricism of fact

o   Emergence through asking a question (p. 59)

§  Not pre-emptive and going into the institution, but being guided by a question; once a question has been asked, other similarities may start to emerge

·       Occurring in an archive (e.g., looking at the minutes of meetings in schools, schedules of workers; esp. institutional archives)

o   Data-stream

o   What kinds of things does the historian need to look at, if one took the empirical route, such that a function can show up as capable of being networked/possibly as part of a network?

o   What function creates the network? Does it produce it? Constitutes?

§  We’re defining a network in functionalist terms; these functions define one another

o   There are multiple form of an empirical answer: strict materialist form, archeologically, excavation,

o   F. as looking down though archives and sets of rules set down for posterity (transcendental?)

o   Can you have truly empirical if looking through it historically?

§  Data-stream (timebooks, meeting minutes, etc.)

o   Foucault as happy positivist

§  Reconstructing Foucault’s methodology as he practices it

·       Where is the dispositif

o   Not wholly abstract because it is part of social reality/part of our present as it continues to influence us

o   Problem of history of the present and empiricism

o   Practices and techniques/technologies (empirical historian)

§  As possibly cross-institutional expressions; clock as functional expression of time measure/segmentation; a clock is not transcendental (maybe empirical-transcendental/empirical)

o   Whatever methodology we ascribe onto Foucault, how does he get this to show up within the thing he calls examination (that shows up within Schools, hospitals, etc.)

§  Examination as a form

o   But do we come to a different understanding if we study them together vs. if we study them distinctly?

§  From within vs. between

o   The functions are that which link the institutions together, so how do we study that togetherness?

§  What is the resemblance?

§  How does this togetherness present itself and how can we make an argument for it? Especially since not every institution is included within this study

·       A clear historicism

o   Technologies link the functions which link the institutions

§  Example of security cameras – function to maintain control over time and body

§  Gradebooks (in other words, records of work, behaviour, and health in the factory, prison, and psychiatric hospital)

Wednesday, October 5, 2022

Punitive Society (1973) Chs. 10 & 11, pp. 170-179 & 186-196

 

We began with questions:

1. What distinguishes illegalisms from laws and morals? How do they all intersect?
2. What is the difference between degradation and dissipation, and how does this distinction play out (or not) today? (pp. 188, 190)
3. What is the relation between workers’ bodies and the production of wealth wealth? Is it a relation of subset or opposition? (p.172)
4. How is this reading connected to the paradigm of war Foucault writes about later on? How is this linked with the notion of knowledge from below/subjugated knowledges (concept from ’76 lectures)?
5. Test, inquiry, examination (p. 196) – can we map this out a bit so as to get the constitutive
components of examination? And can we extend this series forward to the 19th century context he is writing about here? What about practices such as standardized testing—would they be next in sequence or would they be variants of the examination? (thinking as well about education analytics etc.)
6. What does F mean by "capillarization of judgment" (p 194)?
7. How might examples of workers practicing illegalism (work stoppages, strikes, taking long breaks etc) link up with structure and practices of illegalism in apparatuses of education?

 

And then we discussed:

- Alex Feldman has an article on illegalism and F's genealogy of racism.
- p. 75: those who make the law do it in a way that they can evade it
- Thinking about the context of what F is doing in the 70s: moving away from analysis in terms of sovereign power (a power of forbidding) and thinking power in terms of managing
- F seems concerned not so much with all-powerful capital controlling everything but specific techniques of stopping the generation of wealth - “collective machine breaking” (p. 172). More like Bartleby’s mode of disruption - an “I’d rather not.”
- dissipation (moral system) and depredation (legal system) as forms of illegalism (p. 186)
- Perhaps we can say illegalism is a kind of nascent illegality. Something which is on its way to being an illegal act.
- footnote on p.173: Illegalism starts below or before the law. It cannot be captured by the law?
- p. 176: The idea of the immorality of the worker. This is about the body desire, need and will.
- What concept did illegalism become in DP? Or is it not in DP?
- p. 194: We can see how this system of micro adjustments makes individuals… in this realm of paralegality there is this system of micro punishments which forces the individual to become a criminal in this way. Delinquency as a self-fulfilled prophecy.
- The analysis almost points at illegality as an endpoint. In DP, the perspective will have shifted. It’s not that techniques disciplines are dangerous and concerning because they are getting people caught up in law; they are a problematic in and of themselves.
- Foucault shifts away from paradigm where to show something is truly political you have to point to the law and the state. He talks about delinquency and indocility – neither points to the law but they could lead there.
- There is a prehistory of the law which undoes liberal discourse on law from within by showing it has an under-structure.
- The separation of illegalism and legality is of utmost importance. They are different forms of control.
- Education as a set of institutions that among other things help to manage illegalisms
- There is this production of technologies which manage, and it is better for the law if it doesn’t have to manage illegalisms.