Delaporte, The History of Yellow Fever Chs. 6 and 7

We began with questions.  

[1] To what extent is Delaporte engaged in genealogy? What is the relationship of the book to more traditional forms of history?

[2] What should we make of Delaporte’s claim that the mosquito is constituted as an object? What about his distinction between ‘words’ versus ‘concepts’?

[3] On page 144, Delaporte claims to be laying the groundwork for a true archaeology of science. Is this book supposed to be an instance of archaeology? Or is it just laying the groundwork? Presumably this is supposed to differ from a history of science. In DaC didn’t Delaporte make a claim about taking claims in their positivity? Not with the truth or falsity of claims per se. What is the broader context for this book? What makes this argument important? Is it just correcting other historians?

[4] What does Delaporte mean by ‘history’ and ‘historical epistemology’? Is the latter supposed to serve as a corrective to the former? What is the epistemological shift that Delaporte is drawing attention to in the book?

[5] What is does the axiom of historical epistemology involve? (pp. 127, 131).

[6] Is Delaporte successful in setting aside questions of truth and falsity? Or is he ultimately concerned with correcting myths? pp. 106: political practice did not alter the shape of theory (i.e., it was not political indifference). Pp. 136: “psychology has nothing to do with hypothesis formation and verification”. How is this consistent with Delaporte’s broader project? Perhaps this section is an example of Delaporte focusing on figures.

[7] On page 103-5. What should we make of the notions of linearity and (dis)continuity?

[8] Continuity and discontinuity both seem to play an important role in scientific discovery.

 Discussion ensued.

What does FD mean when he says that there is an epistemological transformation on pp. 122? Manson and Finlay are both trying to explain how the Yellow Fever is transferred from one circulatory system to another. Vehicle model: a mechanistic conception of transfer (Finlay). Host model: pays attention to the life cycle as well.

Classical epidemiology as the intersection between parasitology and microbiology. It has both ‘Hippocratic’ and ‘Newtonian’ assumptions built into it.

Can we read this section as an attempt to account for the historical conditions of possibility for epidemiology of the vector?  

On page 108: “no research objects to which… compare”. What is the notion of the ‘research object’ doing?

How would FD characterize the interesting thing about his own account? He is not interested in an analysis that starts with present scientific truth and then assesses past views in relation to it. If it is archaeological, then what are the depth transformations in knowledge?

Perhaps the archaeology component differs from Foucault’s account, insofar as it is internal to science. Foucault looks more broadly. Perhaps the archaeology gives FD a new way of talking about historical contributions. We can hold the opening up of ideas and their wrongness in tension. Archaeology is a domain specific analysis. Genealogy can be read as not domain specific. So DaC could be considered more genealogical in so far as it puts political and economic discourse into conversation with medical knowledge.

 

Traditional historiography (legendary history):

·         FD contrasts two paintings he in his introduction. Master of ceremonies (pp. 4). Focus on these great individuals.

·         Discovery of the truth.

·         Fadedness versus accidental structure.

·         Assumes that there is a single valid point of view and that we can analyze the past in terms of truth and error (does not respect the historical epistemological axiom).

·         Repetition and extension (not fine detail).

Delaporte’s work:

·         Documenting a transformation.

·         Historical epistemological axiom.

·         Privileges fine detail over (simplified) continuity and discontinuity.

·         Perhaps there is a kind of realism/happy positivism about FD’s writing. Pp. 106: appeal to historical accuracy.

·         Reversal: the facts and the conditions of possibility for those facts (i.e., “structure of the visible” and “surface effects”).