Williams TT - Chapter 3

01/25/19

Chapter 3 – The State of Nature: A Rough Guide

Questions:

1.    How do all the things fit together in the chapter?

2.    Relationship between trust and language acquisition and family as an institution? P.49

3.    P.61 Why does the concept of truth have no history? “Truth as such” What would Foucault say to that?

4.    What makes this state of nature? Criteria?

5.    What is the basis or justification for the fictional account? P.52

6.    Plot/graph/chart where he stands vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Foucault

7.    Is he arguing that space and time are primitive concepts?

8.    What do we/Williams consider to be a technology in this case? P.49-50

9.    Is there power in the state of nature? Or does it come in with the real genealogy? 

10.  P. 57 – What is the concern of both local and objective past?

Discussion

State of nature as fictional model of society and then we kick over into real societies. 

The function of the fiction is to form a model that is then shown to map onto actual society?

Could this be a parallel or inversion of Peirce’s idea of truth – very end of inquiry 

Williams appealing to something in the opposite direction – what would we have to attribute to humans holding beliefs and opinions about things prior – hypothetical beginning of inquiry? 

Truth assertion and belief – concept of truth such that truth itself is unchanging – minimalist about truth – empty of content – function of truth is not changing -- 

Special thing about truth – tied to language, knowledge, assertion and belief – truth as a timeless notion 

p. 61 – why truth is the thing that emerges out of all that as the eternal? Why is it that truth is an unchanging thing that qualifies our capacity of language as opposed to other things?

Truth as ground for many other things...couldn’t meaning serve this role?

Truth as in analytical relation to many other things – assertion, belief, knowledge...

Genealogy of truth because it is denied. Whereas a genealogy of belief wouldn’t make sense because no one denies belief. 

Local conception of past – no history because there’s no period/interval – space and time you actually live – restriction – local conception of time and space

Objective conception of past – about contingency – why this history rather than another 

Commonality – they involve tenses 

Difference between local conception of the past and objective conception of the past – difference between time (before and after) and history (past and future) – 

Space – observational technology

Shared language, dry goods – environmental objects, animals – time, space, and indeterminacy, primitive trust, accuracy, sincerity, 

Where is the evolutionary biology in all of this if this is a naturalism? What relationship does evolutionary biology have to this account? Nature before culture? The state of nature part of the story is explicitly fictional – it can be fact defective so long as it’s not law defective. No evidence that it happened – p.31 

Truth only possible with a certain kind of entity (the human) – what would this account need to look like if he were accounting for other entities/animals 

Primitive – historically vs. logically – 

There must be culture in the state of nature, and that’s human – p.43

Why is this state of nature the best mythology for his genealogy?

What is put into the story that reveals things about our society – what we take for granted 

Harmfulness of his method of providing a fictional story or mythology? 

Easier to hook up an imaginary genealogy with a real history – not pretending to provide explanatory details as evolutionary developmental stories. 

Williams is frankly anthropocentric – 

What could we take Foucault to say about that such that they would agree? – about the timelessness of the concept of truth – truth as a stability against which things would vary – 

Foucault – tracking the history of the will to truth – why did truth become so important to these people? Why did the will to truth become so important? 

Existence of truth – Williams – internal conceptual relationships between truth, assertion, and belief

Explanatory value of the story

Foucauldians making peace with the transcendental Kantians 

Williams TNT Chapter 2

CGC Notes: 1-18-19

Williams - Genealogy

Questions:

1.      What is the import of non-genetic learning? Is this exclusive to homo-sapiens? What is the relevance to this for genealogy as a method.

2.      Is genealogy supposed to justify ethical naturalism (naturalist explanations), or is it part of a naturalist account?

3.      What is the relationship between explanation, justification and vindication for Williams?

4.      (32-24) Power of genealogy in introducing the idea of function where you wouldn’t expect it. How does this work? How to we get function out of fiction? What are the constraints on fiction such that it can introduce function?

5.      Where is the critical aspect of William’s account of genealogy?

6.      The distinction between history and abstraction: what is the status of genealogy as a kind of explanation?

7.      Does Williams get “vitalism” right, historically and conceptually? If not, is this significant. Compare with Canguilhem’s account of vitalism.

8.      “History” versus “matters of fact”. What does it mean to bring history into genealogical practice?

9.      What is the scope of imaginary genealogy? Why does it have to be strictly imaginary?

Discussion:

Naturalism:

·         Williams’ genealogy is specifying a particular version of naturalism (against other forms). His genealogical account is supposed to serve the new version of naturalism.

·         Williams offers a few different conceptions: not “scientific naturalism” understood as reduction. (23) Questions of naturalism are not about reductionism but about explanation. “Can we explain the phenomenon in question in terms of the rest of nature”. How is this distinct from reduction? Is reduction a metaphysical claim? Is Williams’ account more epistemological (doesn’t make a claim about what is real)? Different levels of explanation: “cannot tell ethological story without introducing culture” (23). Francois Jacob as giving a similar picture (Russian nesting dolls). Williams wants to leave questions open (unlike reductionists). Williams is talking about ethical naturalism.

·         Is Nietzsche’s genealogy of ethics an example? gives a natural account which can influence how we think about good/evil. Relationship between ethics and psychology (26). (See also page 22).

·         State of nature: Does Williams’ move to the study of the state of nature mark an important difference from Nietzsche? Strategic decision to talk about state of nature? Williams wants to discuss the status of genealogy as an explanation. Williams wants to look to state of nature accounts as a possible form of (non-causal) explanation. Does Williams think of the state of nature explanations of the state as genealogy? Discussion of Nozick (31). Something productive about the state of nature arguments for developing an account of genealogical explanation. One important difference: Craig, for Williams, comes along and asks what is knowledge for? Maybe this is a difference with respect to political philosophy: asking the question “what is a state for?” is obvious, whereas this is not the case for knowledge. Is the aim to justify a political system?

Explanation, Justification and Vindication:

·         Is vindication the same as justification? “One might accept Hume’s account… and still give justice… its same respect”

·         Imaginative can reveal a gap that can be filled with other values (39). What does it mean to say that imaginary genealogy reveals its own limitations?

·         Footnote 19: can genealogical explanation be such as to strengthen or weaken one’s confidence in them?

·         Is Williams saying the genealogy can fill various roles (vindication, subversion, etc.)? Or is there a “right” way of doing it? Is Nietzsche’s account satisfactory? It definitely leaves something out.

·         This book’s aim is ultimately vindicatory. This is because the state of nature introduces the idea of function.

·         Why not just give a functional account without the story? (Kitcher’s The Ethical Project)

·         Fiction and history are necessary and jointly sufficient for an adequate explanation?

Role of history:

·         Fills in gaps, extends genealogy, introduces the autonomy of the function (39-40).

Formalization of doing explanatory genealogy:

1.      Take a concept whose function is not obvious.

2.      Give a fictional account of the state of nature, where the function for that concept is located.

3.      Describe that location as one where everyone (in the state of nature) recognizes the function, and then that function becomes a reason for action.

4.      History fills in the gap and extend the story.

How does this not commit the genetic fallacy? How could the state of nature story every justify something. Is the explanation automatically vindicating? Even if the vindication falls apart, doing the historical excavation of the origins of collective reasons for action could still be useful.

If we can produce an abstract fictionalized model, then history provides a filling-in. Does this historical work fill in the abstract model? Or extend in terms of historical-temporal development? Can we think this in terms of form and content (fictionalized state of nature would give the form, history the content). Can history actually perform this role?

Is the state of nature an origin story?

Critical aspect Williams’ project: the turn to vindication erases the critical dimension involved with power (Martin Saar)

It seems lie Williams wants to give an account of the role of fictional genealogies. How are we supposed to choose between competing fictional accounts? Nozick’s, distinction between law and fact defective accounts might be helpful here.

Williams, T&T, Ch. 1

We began, as per usual, with questions:

Pg. 5 -- BW mentions "the party of common sense" as having a conception of truth.  What is that conception?

Pg. 5 -- Can we more fully flesh out the positions of the "deniers" or "subverters" and the "common sensists" about truth?

Pg. 12 -- BW refers to positivism as a default position.  What would positivism mean as a default position?

Pg. 12 -- How do we distinguish between BW's notion of "everyday truth" and his idea that positivism holds that "no interpretation is needed"?

Pg. 15 -- references to "these beliefs, "these conclusions," and "this antagonism" need clarification.

Pg. 2-3 -- Denunciation of history requires history -- what does he mean by history?

Pg. 2 -- Relationship between truth and authority.

Pg. 19 -- BW describes genealogy as a tripartite effort: fiction, history, and philosophy.  Is the concern about truthfulness a concern about the normativity of critique?  Is it really a concern about the normative foundations of critique?

Pg. 5 -- How can those of us who are committed to certain forms of Continental philosophy take BW's notion of the "skeptics," "subverters," and "deniers" (the latter is the term that BW wants) as plausible?  (This is not a rhetorical question.)


We then moved to discussion:

Williams at times too breezily engages certain figures or tendencies in contemporary thought (writing of "'deconstructive' histories" and scholarship that relies on a "mangling" of Saussure).  But is there a problem he has his finger on that doesn't rely on these kind of breezy engagements?

BW's definition of terms:
"Common sense" view -- this group doesn't think there is much of a problem about truth.  They deny that the value of the role that truth plays in our lives is "related to larger structures of thought" informed by social and political reality (6).  An extreme positivism, perhaps.

"Deniers" view -- They deny that there is "an essential role for the notion of truth in our understanding of language and of each other" (6).  They think we can hold on to the value of truthfulness without holding on to the value of truth.

Williams's view -- We need to ask about, and understand, the "value of truth" (6) in connection with [essential connection with?] the value of truthfulness -- and understand that value as historically complex, socially-loaded, and politically-fraught.   So BW wants to do justice to both "everyday truth" and "interpretive" historical narrative (9-10).

Williams's worry is motivated in part by a concern about the risks of the irrelevance of the humanities (3).

Wms's method -- genealogy as tripartite -- fiction + history + philosophy (19).  How do we understand this as methodology?  We'll get to this next week -- Chapter 2.

Draft Syllabus for an 8-week unit on Foucault with "Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling" at its center

Draft Syllabus for a class unit based on Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling (to be used in a course on Foucault, or on genealogy, or on truth & truthfulness, or on ...; envisioned audience is advanced undergraduates with significant experience in philosophy).

The draft syllabus below describes the basic focus of each lecture in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling followed by a brief list of texts (mostly by Foucault) that we would propose to pair with these.

Inaugural Lecture
This lecture offers a statement of aims: to give an account of the practice of avowal, with a specific attention to juridical contexts; four-part definition of avowal as a kind of speech act.
 - Foucault interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: Overview of a Work in Progress" (1983, in EW1)
 - passage(s) on speech act and énoncé in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969)
 - John Austin, "Performative Utterances" (1961)
 - Dreyfus and Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Ch. 3 (1982)

First Lecture
This lecture presents an episode of 'quasi-avowal' in antiquity drawn from an chariot race in Homer's Iliad; themes include differences between rituals of oath-taking and rituals in which truth is just demonstrated.
 - Lectures on the Will to Know, Jan. 27 lecture, Ch. 5 (1971)
 - The Punitive Society, Jan. 10 lecture, Ch. 2 (1973)

Second Lecture
This lecture focuses on Oedipus Rex to detail the following themes: sovereign right and power, procedure and the juridicial form, recognition of oneself as the author of a crime, characterization of a crime, trial.
 - History of Sexuality, Volume One: "Right of Death & Power Over Life" from HS1 (1976)
 - "Truth and Juridical Forms" Rio Lectures; second lecture, "Oedipus and Truth" (1973)
 - Sophocles, Oedipus Rex (429 BC)

Third Lecture
This lecture focuses on veridiction of self in pagan antiquity, with specific attention to Seneca's examination of conscience; as well as penance in early Christianity.
 - On the Government of the Living 12 Mar & 19 Mar lectures (1980)
 - "Technologies of Self" Vermont lectures in EW1 (1982); especially section 3 on Seneca and section 5 on exomologesis
 - "Self Writing" in EW1 on Seneca and hupomnemata (undated?; early 1980s)

Fourth Lecture
This lecture focused on monastic practices in 4th and 5th centuries and expansion of projects of the management of life and souls; themes of obedience, humility, and submission.
 - "What is Critique?" (1978); paired with Butler's "What Is Critique: An Essay on Foucault's Virtue" (2001), plus last two chapters of Giving an Account of Oneself (2003)
 - History of Sexuality, Volume One (1976); introductory pages
 - Discipline and Punish (1975); introductory pages

Fifth Lecture
This lecture considers connections for future research (including link between hermeneutics of the text and hermeneutics of the self in Christianity and the uptake of the hermeneutics of the self from the Christian tradition  by Schopenhauer and Freud); the main focus is then on the juridification of avowal within the ecclesastical tradition and institution.
 - Security, Territory, Population; 8 February lecture focused on pastoral power and governmentality (1978)
 - “Christianity and Confession” Dartmouth lecture (1980)
 - "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" on historigraphical categories of emergence, descent, and origins (1971)

Sixth Lecture
This lecture focuses on juridification in ecclesiastical, and especially political, institutions.  Intervention of human science of punishment; topics and concepts include punishment, torture, dramaturgy, examination, social defense, criminal subjectivity.
 - This lecture would pair well with a whole range of Foucault's writings from the early 1970s
 - "Truth and Juridical Forms" Rio lectures; especially the last lecture (1973)
 - Punitive Societey, 10 Jan. (lecture 2), 24 Jan. (lecture 2), 7 Feb (lecture 6);  14 Mar. (lecture 11) (1973)
 - Discipline and Punish, selections (1975)
 - Abnormal, 15 Jan.  (lecture 2), 5. Feb (lecture 5), 12 Feb (lecture 6) (1975)
 - History of Sexuality, Volume One, chapter on "scientia sexualis" (Part III) (1976)


General comparative texts: HSv2 and HSv3.
 
General informative texts: Foucault's interviews, especially "The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom," "On the Genealogy of Ethics," and "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism".

Four-part analysis of avowal in 'Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling'

Draft/In-Progress

Based on Foucault's description/definition of the "speech act" of avowal (on pp. 15-17).

Avowal (as a passage from unsaid to truly said)	Subject of Avowal	Subject to whom avowed (the other who recognizes)	Costly (cost not in the act, but in the content)	Freely-stated (such that the subj enters obligation)	Submission within a power relation (power-over)	Modifies or transforms the subject
	Subjects of Avowal		Four Qualities of Avowal
Lecture 1: Iliad	Antilochus	Menelaus, Achilles, etc.	Yes; costs him the race prize	Yes; by not taking the oath, A confirms the truth	Yes; b/w A and M; also between A and the Gods	Yes; as "restoring" (p. 40) truth; transforms A's relation to others
Lecture 2: Oedipus Rex	Shepherd of Cithareon (not Teresias/Apllo, nor Jocasta/Oedi)	Oedipus & Chorus	Yes; costs the slave	Yes; "despite the fact" that avowed under threat (79; cf. 16)	Yes; b/w shepherd and Oedipus	Not really; but it transforms Oedipus
Lecture 3: Stoics  Examination of Conscience   Exposure of Soul	Seneca Serenus	Seneca (98) Seneca	No No	Yes Yes	No Yes	No change in status of subject; gives subject tranquility  (97) and memory (99) No; Seneca says he already was cured (103)
Lecture 3 Christian Penance (exomologesis)	Sinner (becomes Penitent)	Church authority	Yes	Yes [Unclear]?	Yes	Yes (105): exomologesis
Lecture 4 Christian Monasticism (4th-5th c.) (exagoreusis)	Christian Monk	Director	Yes	Yes	Yes (126, 129)	Yes
Lecture 5 Fixed Penance (7th c.); "juridificaiton" -- p. 178ff. Sacrament of Penance (11th-13th c.) -- p. 184ff.	Sinner Sinner	Community Confessor	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes
Lecture 6 Judicial Avowal (16th c. - 18th c.) -- p. 201-11 Modern Examination (19c. -- ) -- p. 211ff.	Accused Accused (Dangerous Individual)	Judge (as sovereign) Examiner (see 211)	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes

END

WDTT, Lecture 6

We began, per custom, with questions:

Foucault's use of the metaphor of "dramaturgy" (p. 210) in contrast to the "symbolic" and the "performative".   Where else in his writings or lectures does he use this metaphor?  And why specifically is the form of avowal in this lecture dramaturgical, but the other forms of avowal in other lectures were not dramaturgical?  How does dramaturgy differ from performativity on Foucault's account?  What is the concept of "dramaturgy" here?

Foucault's discussion of hermeneutics of self in this lecture.  He distinguishes between a Christian/ancient hermeneutics of the subject and a more modern kind of textual-analytical notion of the hermeneutics of the subject (225)?  Why does he choose the term "hermeneutics"?  Why does he think of psychoanalytical and psycho-clinical notions of the subject in terms of hermeneutics, when they do not display the kind of 'openness' to the text that hermeneutics in a philosophical sense does?  (See also p. 167).

We had questions on continuing to track Foucault's historiographical categories -- language of "new object" and "introduced" and "formed".  How to map to the distinction between "origin" and "emergence" (and "descent") in Foucault's 1971 essay?  What about Foucault's use of paradigmatic cases of psychology?  How is Foucault's historiography here different from Kuhn's?

Foucault ends up arguing in this lecture that the avowal is insufficient in cases of, say, crimes without reason.  Why is it considered insufficient here?  (See pp. 215-16).

Relatedly, when Foucault says that the avowal was deficient in the context of modern psychology and jurispreudence (p. 211) and was replaced by the examination (p. 211; cf. Discipline and Punish), how do we understand the long lectures preceding this on avowal?  Why is avowal important?  How did it do something other than drop out?

What is the position of these lectures from 1981 vis-a-vis Foucault's genealogies of ethics and genealogies of power?


Discussion ensued:

In terms of relationship between avowal and examination -- one useful source would be Foucault's discussion in History of Sexuality, Volume One on the link between the confession and the modern scientia sexualis.  The question is one of continuity; how is there continuity between confessional technologies of the self and modern sciences.

• Is the idea something like the following?  The practice/project of avowal set up a kind of functional technology of the self; but then this particular practice can (for various reasons [that remain unclear?]) no longer function in that way in 18th c. & 19th c. penal practice, so that then some other technology of the self had to come in to fulfill that function or play that role.  This other technology of the self is that of the examination (p. 211).
• So the idea is that avowal is important to our history not because of how we continue to practice avowal today, but rather because avowal created a function (a veridictional function) that we continue to need to fulfill.  "Avowal by the guilty party has become a fundamental need of the system" (209); such that later "the examination... filled the white or black spaces left by avowal" (211).

We discussed dramaturgy vs. performative vs. symbolic.

• Is MF's reference to "dramaturgy" here a silent reference to Goffman?
• Why is this avowal (modern avowal) of such dramaturgical import, but others earlier aren't?  Or is it that they're just not explicitly stated to be, or analyzed as, dramaturgical?

We discussed the methodology here as caught between genealogies of power and histories of ethics:

• MF's category of technologies of the self is here interesting.