Williams, T&T, Ch. 1

We began, as per usual, with questions:

Pg. 5 -- BW mentions "the party of common sense" as having a conception of truth.  What is that conception?

Pg. 5 -- Can we more fully flesh out the positions of the "deniers" or "subverters" and the "common sensists" about truth?

Pg. 12 -- BW refers to positivism as a default position.  What would positivism mean as a default position?

Pg. 12 -- How do we distinguish between BW's notion of "everyday truth" and his idea that positivism holds that "no interpretation is needed"?

Pg. 15 -- references to "these beliefs, "these conclusions," and "this antagonism" need clarification.

Pg. 2-3 -- Denunciation of history requires history -- what does he mean by history?

Pg. 2 -- Relationship between truth and authority.

Pg. 19 -- BW describes genealogy as a tripartite effort: fiction, history, and philosophy.  Is the concern about truthfulness a concern about the normativity of critique?  Is it really a concern about the normative foundations of critique?

Pg. 5 -- How can those of us who are committed to certain forms of Continental philosophy take BW's notion of the "skeptics," "subverters," and "deniers" (the latter is the term that BW wants) as plausible?  (This is not a rhetorical question.)


We then moved to discussion:

Williams at times too breezily engages certain figures or tendencies in contemporary thought (writing of "'deconstructive' histories" and scholarship that relies on a "mangling" of Saussure).  But is there a problem he has his finger on that doesn't rely on these kind of breezy engagements?

BW's definition of terms:
"Common sense" view -- this group doesn't think there is much of a problem about truth.  They deny that the value of the role that truth plays in our lives is "related to larger structures of thought" informed by social and political reality (6).  An extreme positivism, perhaps.

"Deniers" view -- They deny that there is "an essential role for the notion of truth in our understanding of language and of each other" (6).  They think we can hold on to the value of truthfulness without holding on to the value of truth.

Williams's view -- We need to ask about, and understand, the "value of truth" (6) in connection with [essential connection with?] the value of truthfulness -- and understand that value as historically complex, socially-loaded, and politically-fraught.   So BW wants to do justice to both "everyday truth" and "interpretive" historical narrative (9-10).

Williams's worry is motivated in part by a concern about the risks of the irrelevance of the humanities (3).

Wms's method -- genealogy as tripartite -- fiction + history + philosophy (19).  How do we understand this as methodology?  We'll get to this next week -- Chapter 2.