The group began as per usual with questions:
There were many questions about section 12:
How does Nietzsche arrive at the idea that processes of domination tied to reinterpretation? What is his method for getting there?
How do we understand the relationship between Ntz’s broader claims and his discussion of important? (Sect 12 and sect 13)
Is Nietzsche’s historical method metaphysically comprehensive enough to do any meaningful explanatory work?
How do we parse out the following ideas in Nietzsche’s genealogy: utility, origin, emergence, functional meaning, evolution.
How do the following three ideas hang together:
A) Emergence differs from Usefulness
B) Everything consists of Domination/Overpowering
C) Every domination is an Interpretation
The group then moved to discussion:
We can distinguish three claims:
A) A) Origin/Emergence not equal to Usefulness/Utility/Purpose (to what extent is purpose/useful intentional?)
B) B) Everything that occurs consists of Overpowering/Dominating
C) C) Every Dominating consists of Reinterpretation
What is the relationship between (A) on the one hand and (B) and (C)? How do we get from (A) to (B)? How do we get from (B) to (C)? Or does (A) itself follow from (B) and (C)?
These three claims refer to three ideas:
A) A) Origin≠Purpose
B) B) Power
C) C) Meaning
As an example of (C), Nietzsche discusses in Section 13 the multiple meanings of punishment. These multiple meanings analytically breaks apart “a kind of unity” of meaning (13).
On our reading, (B) involves (C). And from (B) and (C) together (A) follows. If (B) and (C) hold, then the negation of (A) (i.e., that purpose is determined by punishment) cannot be true. The idea seems to be that (B) (presumably somehow together with (C)) destabilizes any purpose built in to origin.
(A) is the conclusion of the argument.
(B) is the main premise.
(C) is an additional premise (though it is not clear why this is essential to the argument).
To explain this reading...
Nietzsche’s view is that (B) happens; that is (B) is always set to happen. (B) requires a power differential. This is not metaphysical, but naturalistic. (Or is it metaphysical?)
Then what is the relation between (B) and (C)? Does (B) follow from (C)? Or is (C) just be (B)?
By overpowering, a meaning is imposed. The overpowering is the meaning-making. The overpowering (plus the resistance).
The overpowering “consists of” (rather than “entails”) re-interpretation.
The overpowering, such that it can be reinterpreted, has to be exacted by that which lives. Is it that which lives? Or is that which is intentional?
Not likely that intentionality is a requirement for Nietzsche, because he uses an example the exaptation of a ‘physiological organ’.
Ntz draws the line between the vital and the nonvital, rather than between the intentionally vital and the non-intentionally vital.
But this raises a problem for how meaning changes, for how (B) leads to (C) in the sense of reinterpretation of meaning.
But where does the reinterpretation come from? Why is it the meaning? Is meaning [Sinn] itself organic?
So meaning here happens not at the level of linguistic intentionality, but rather at the level of power.
Meaning as Sinn not necessarily linguistic meaning.
There is a methodological problem raised by all of this that we discussed:
If the practice’s purposes/uses changes, then what is the continuity of the form? Why not just call them different practices?
What would be Ntz’s methodology for tracking this? Is it philology?
Nietzsche is clear that the procedure (Prozedur) is independent from the purpose/utility. This raises a methodological problem.
The methodological question is how we would track a procedure as the same? In what does continuity of procedure consist such that we can track it?
What are the methodological options we have for establishing continuity?
Continuity through functional use (Nietzsche rejects this; is arguing against this)
Continuity through linguistic resemblance
Continuity through morphological resemblance
Continuity through descent (hypothesized)
Continuity through descent (causal-empirical)
In discussion we came to the tentative conclusion that continuity is established through descent. This is a naturalistic-causal process for Nietzsche. In the best cases it can be studied/established empirically.
Nietzsche then concludes that punishment does many things (13). Therefore punishment does not have just the one supposed benefit of inducing guilt (14). In fact punishment makes people harder and less guilty (14).
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