Ch. 3 (cont.)

We began with questions from last week as well as some additional questions: 1. TT p. 67: Discursive/non-discursive 2. D/R p. 82: D/R on Heidegger/Wittgenstein 3. D/R p. 83/83/84: On phenomenology (why parallel to Husserl); is MF bracketing? 4. D/R p. 79: How does being inside the discursive practices give D/R the grounding they want vs. being outside the discursive practices? [Hermeneutics and being inside discursive practice.] 5. TT p. 58: Can we break savoir into different components? 6. TT p. 55: Is it the case that we can only fully understand power and practices of the self against the background savoir? Conversation ensued… Q2/Q3: —Recognition of TT need to respond to D/R critique of Foucault. D/R’s reading of Wittgenstein is informed by Kripke (skeptical relativist reading of LW). Still holds a distinction between semantic and pragmatic. —Regulaism: Chomsky/Levi-Strauss —Regularist: Wittgenstein {Regulism/Regularism—Structuralism/Hermeneutics} —Do nondiscursive practices do more than explain discursive practices? —Foucault is committed to nondiscursive conceptual practices—is Foucault interested in this beyond the explanatory power it offers? —Do discursive practices vs. nondiscursive practices take explanatory priority for Foucault? Or for Foucault? Does Tiisala read the nondiscursive practices as savoir? Is this how Foucault reads it?