Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, third selection (Ch. 3 + Conclusion)

Group’s Questions

Can the argument that CM draws through JD be threaded through the following conceptual chain?  Habit-action-Intelligence-sociality-communication-education.  Are there other concepts in the sequence?  Is that the right chain?

 

How does one make sense of the analysis of JD in terms of “automation”?  How would we square this with the existing secondary literature on Dewey?

 

How does the Bourdieu quote (98) orient the inquiry of the chapter?  Does this lead to a post-disciplinary conception?

 

Gap between unintelligent/reactive and intelligent/exploratory inquiry? (102)

What is the relationship between inquiry and reflexivity for CM?

 

Is the idea of “a fair and emancipatory political vision of a cybernetic being-together” (123) to be understood in terms of an idea of “the commons?”  Is it possible that this political vision lets technology and democracy off the hook too easily?  For instance, in the context of colonial tendencies of technology and democracy?  Can these be on the hook without a technophobic impetus driving them?

 

 

 

Group’s Responses

On automation, Malabou’s conception here involves “a double valency of mechanical constraint and freedom” (100).  This connects to Dewey’s notion of habit (and also connects to Foucault on conduct and counter-conduct we think).  “Rendering the indeterminate determinate,” is central in Dewey (103).  For Malabou, this is to be understood in the context of the practical (rather than the theoretical/intellectual) (101).

 

After discussion, here is the chain for Dewey on CM’s reading (filling in a few missing details):

·         [Automation] – action – habit – experience – inquiry – intelligence – democracy – sociality – communication – education

·         The chain is one of successive clarification and enrichment (a dialectical chain)

 

So what this clarifies for us is that automation for CM is a mediation concept, not a domination concept.  Automation is a dialectical concept.  Automation without guarantees.

 

“The same plasticity can be called upon to contradict any predestination, all hierarchization in the aesthetic and cognitive response to forms,” (137).

 

The project of the book works to move away from technophobia, and without falling into techno-optimism.  But does the negation of technophobia offer a positive politics of technology?