Gould, Mismeasure on Spearman

We began, as per usual, with questions:

What does SJG mean by g-loading and what is the difference between g and s?

What is and is not included in g for Spearman? 

SJG discusses “automatic reification” (p. 299).  Does this account entail that there are some valid or warranted forms of reification?  In other words, is SJG opposed to reification as such, or is he arguing against certain styles/types of reification?

Why is Spearman using political metaphors to contrast differing theories of intelligence (p. 287)?  He refers to “oligarchic,” “monarchic,” and “anarchic” components of intelligence theorizing/testing.

How do we fill in the missing assumptions in SJG’s critique of “reductionism” in Spearman (p. 292)?  What is at stake in a reductionist critique?

How do we understand SJG’s distinction between theory-guided science and “rough-and-ready” empiricist science (p. 293)?

 

Discussion ensued:

What does SJG mean by “automatic reification” (p. 299)?  Is it “automatic” insofar as it is a form of “reification” (or positing of a causal influence for a reified g) that reads off a causal posit from a mathematical factor?  SJG’s “complaint” is “with the practice of assuming that the mere existence of a factor, in itself, provides a license for causal speculation” (p. 298)?  For SJG, “no set of factors has any claim to exclusive concordance with the real world” (p. 299)?

What is SJG’s criterion for when reification is warranted rather than not?  His earlier critique of reification (282-285) refers to reifications “aris[ing] from the mathematics alone” but rather “only from additional knowledge of the physical nature of the measures themselves” (p. 280).

Does this make SJG a staunch realist?

So is SJG’s argument that there is no possible measure of a single thing that is “intelligence”?  Or is the argument that there is as-yet no viable measure of a single “intelligence”?

We need to separate SJG’s critique of “measurement” of intelligence versus a potential critique of the idea that there is a physical seat of intelligence.

Okay, here is what we think:

1.        (1) SJG holds that factor analysis of intelligence tests fails to license inference to the reification of intelligence (for the reasons stated above on p. 280, p. 292, etc.).

2.        (2) Given (1), SJG holds that there is no justification for an account of the causal processes productive of intelligence.

However here is an issue:

So in order to motivate (2), SJG ends up needing to adopt a kind of realist philosophy of science (based in physics).  But this quite possibly ends up being question-begging by assuming a realist standard.  So the standard for evidence/warrant becomes “reifiable” (in a sense that does not reduce/abstract real entities).

Why not adopt a more functionalist account?  Why not ignore the whole issue of reification and just don’t worry about whether or not that which is being measured (intelligence) is reifiable?