November 9, 2018

After reading the fourth lecture of Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, we posed and discussed the following questions:

-      Why did the virtues of humilitas, patientia and subditio (p.138-139) require necessary verbalization in monastic institutions? (p.140)

-      What is the difference between indefinite obedience and definite state of obedience that Foucault is suggesting as part of the monastic culture? (p.140)

-      The verbalization of avowal played a central role in monastic institutions. What is the relation of the one who is listening and who is speaking in this context? Is this an ethical or linear relationship? 

-      The contrast that Foucault emphasizes between the notion of self-mastery in antiquity and the constant obedience in monastic institutions seems similar to the distinction between enlightenment as maturity and immaturity that Kant made in What is enlightenment. Can we find here a parallel between Foucault’s work on antiquity and enlightenment and maybe discover one of the reasons of his engagement with antiquity?

-      What is the connection between art of living or aesthetics of existence that Foucault talks about and the relationship between master and student in antiquity? Does this relationship constitute a technology of the self?

-      It seems to be a paradox in monastic culture:  On the one hand, everybody is condemned to constant obedience and nobody is perfect. On the other hand, avowal needs to be directed to another subject. But is anybody the highest in this hierarchy or are the subjects in a circular relationship?

-      Foucault mentions technology and “technical problems” couple of times in this lecture. Why is it in this lecture that this notion is repeated? Is there anything in the monastic institutions that necessary includes or requires technology?

Beside discussing the above questions and completing and discussing the table, we also discussed the following points:

The role of God seems to have a marginal role in Foucault’s discussion. We can conclude that avowal isn’t in the first place directed to God.

Avowal needs to be free and that is true for avowal in monastic institutions as well. Although there is subjection and obedience involved, we know from Foucault’s work on the concept of freedom that freedom is not necessarily in contrast to power but is the very condition of it. Thus the subject is free despite being subjected to power relations and constant obedience. Free here is not meant in a metaphysical sense but what is “considered” free. An example of lack of freedom in the medieval context might be a demonized and deceived subject.

Socrates constitutes a figure who is on the edge of antiquity and Christianity. The techniques that are used in the student-master relationship in Socratic context are similar to Christianity: You have to discover the truth in yourself and that says something about who you are. The codes are here different, but the techniques are similar.

The distinction between moral code and technique that Foucault makes in the second volume of The history of sexuality is helpful here. It is the latter that is the central aspect of Foucault’s analysis.

The relation to the other is constitutive for the role of the master and for the student to become the master of himself. This is important because it shows the constitutive role of the other for gaining something that we might call autonomy or mastery over oneself.