The group began, as per our usual practice, with questions:
1) How exactly is Foucault periodizing the various eras of Greek thought he is here considering? What are the historical relations between the archaic period, the classical age, the sophists, and the philosophers?
2) Why the Greeks, Monsieur Foucault? (Consider p. 67 and Foucault's assertion of continuity from the Greeks to us.)
3) How does Platonic phil. differ from Sophistry, for Foucault? (See p. 67).
4) What is truth as it emerges in Foucault's investigation into its emergence? If truth is emergent, is it made up? If there is truth, then what is it for Foucault? (See. p. 73-75)
5) Foucault suggests that true statements, in order to be true, must neutralize their status as events, their materiality, etc.. How do the intentions of the sophist versus those of the philosopher condition this neutrality? (See p. 60).
6) Is there a normative evaluation on Foucault's part here of the pre-philosophical sophists?
Discussion ensued:
We began with a discussion of philosophy's attempt to purify itself in Aristotle. We asked about the extent to which we can trace contemporary (1971) philosophy to the classical philosophy of the Greeks. Aristotle, says Foucault, is "the point of view that still commands us" (67). Is Foucault here tracing an unbroken line from the Greeks to the present? In response, it was suggested that Foucault is characterizing philosophy in terms of exclusion, and so if those exclusions persisted through to the present Foucault is trying to gain a view of how philosophy depends on exclusions.
We then discussed the exclusion by Aristotelian discourse of intention, will, desire. How is Aristotle excluding the Sophist? And with what interests? Is the exclusion of the sophistical itself a philosophical move?
What is the relation of judicial limits on truth to, apophantic philosophical discourse? Do the two phases of judicial discourse anticipate philosophical and sophistical discourse, respectively?
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