Winter 2015 Meeting Schedule

We will begin our Winter readings with Louise Amoore's The Politics of Possibility and move on to other selected texts from there. Our schedule is as follows:

All meetings are Thursdays 2.00p - 3.30p(ish).

Week 1 - Pass
Week 2 - Jan 15 - EMU, S Dining E (Room 113A) - Amoore, Politics of Possibility, "Introduction"
Week 3 - Jan 22 - EMU (Room 113A) - Amoore, Ch. 1
Week 4 - Jan 29 - move to SCH 111A - Amoore, Ch. 2
Week 5 - Feb 5 - SCH 111A - Amoore, Ch. 6
Week 6 - Feb 12 - SCH 111A - Neocleous, Critique of Security, Ch.1

Week 7 - Feb 19 - SCH 111A - Foucault, On the Government of the Living, Ch. 1

Week 8 - Feb 26 - SCH 111A - Foucault, On the Government of the Living, Ch. ???
Week 9 - Mar 5 - SCH 111A - TBD???
Week 10 - Pass

Other Winter term readings: perhaps some selections (chs. 1 & 4?) from Foucault's On the Government of the Living?, and what else?

Spring term will be workshops featuring our own work and that of visitors.

2014-15 Focus: Beyond Biopolitics

Our theme for 2014-15 will be "Biopolitics and Beyond" and our format will be a little different this round.  As we enjoy the good fortune of having Nicolae Morar back at UO this year, our focus for the Fall term will be Dr. Morar's grad course titled "Biopower: Foucault and Beyond" (for information on the class go here: http://pages.uoregon.edu/nmorar/Nicolae_Morar/Phil407_507F14.html). Participants this year will participate in (take for credit or informally attend) this class (but if you are really eager to participate in Wtr/Spr but cannot attend Dr. Morar's course due to a scheduling conflict, email me, and we'll see if we can work out an alternative).

In the Winter we will meet approximately weekly to discuss recent texts in the emerging 'beyond biopower' literature.

In the Spring we will aim to convene once again a more workshop-and-charette style environment where participants share their work and where we may once again skype in a visitor or two who is doing front-edge work in this area.

Spring Term Workshops

This term we will meet Fridays at 2:00pm for workshops on group members' (and a few visitors) work.  Below is a draft schedule -- nothing is set in stone yet.

Week 1 - April 4 - Nick chapter on Foucault and mass culture (confirmed)
Week 2 - April 11 - Larry paper on the genetic fallacy (confirmed)
Week 3 - April 18 - no meeting
Week 4 - April 25 - Fulden paper on genealogy, phenomenology, and the body (confirmed)
Week 5 - May 2 - ?TBD
Week 6 - May 9 - no meeting (members out of town)
Week 7 - May 16 - Dr. Verena Erlenbusch, University of Memphis (joining via video/skype), ms. paper on terrorism (confirmed)
Week 8 - May 23 - Colin draft paper on CdF lectures and GIP writings from 1971
Week 9 - May 30 - Final quick wrap-up meeting, plans for next year

Oedipal Knowledge

            Questions:

1.      Why does every philosopher read Antigone/Oedipus and nothing else? Sophocles was not the only playwright in Ancient Greece.

2.      Why Oedipus? What does Oedipus do for Foucault? What does it get him in terms of the arguments he’s been making in the other lectures? Is he giving an “interpretation”? And if not, what is he doing?

3.      Would this be considered a genealogical account? Tracing a moment at which power/knowledge was attempted to be separated from one another – talking about transition (not just archeological snapshot). But it’s also lacking some features of genealogy: looking at this very foundational text, which he gets away from later. Is this a genealogy or if not what is it?

4.      Pg 249 the tyrant and the seer vs. Pg 189 tyrant, the sage, popular power : Why does popular power drop out, does it drop out? 3 great procedures: do these map onto the tyrant, the sage, popular power?

5.      Power/knowledge

6.      What’s the role of excess and transgression here (256-7)?

Discussion:

            Why not engage anyone other than Sophocles who can refute the picture Sophocles gives? Foucault analyzes few scattered remnants of texts from Ancient Greece and from that deduces, this is how it was in Ancient Greece. It seems completely fallacious.

            Oedipus has been read wrong. He is a figure that embodies two competing claims to knowledge, a figure of excess and transgression. Here is this thing that has been read in one way, and here is another way to read it. So is this an interpretation?

            This could be read in an English class. But it could also be used as a tool for genealogy. It is the only literary text he deals with. Except Homer: historical position on Homer – how truth claims were made in Greek society (pushes literary elements aside). Whereas this lecture engages the literary aspects of the play very deeply.

            This is a great reading of Oedipus but we are desensitized to it because we are so focused on power/knowledge.

            What is he getting out of it, other than convenience? If you’re a Continental philosopher, you have to write on Bartleby, even though it’s not even central to Melville’s corpus.

            He doesn’t look at Homer, but all these obscure texts. He draws on all the stuff that you have to go to archives to get it. Maybe it’s an interpretation here, or maybe something that’s not an interpretation. But maybe then he realized you can’t do that with texts like Oedipus.

            But how do you approach a work of art? It’s a piece of fiction, an artwork. Can we draw anything conclusive from it? And if you can’t, it seems like it’s never not an interpretation. This text as a product of its moment – he doesn’t analyze that. Is it symptomatic of these things in Greek society? But he doesn’t do that – something happens in society and here is its representation in literature. Oedipus as representing societal change?

            Agamben: Foucault’s method is paradigmatic. He finds a paradigm for this broader social assembly. For example: Bentham’s sketches of the panopticon. Maybe Oedipus was paradigmatic.

            What, then, is the tragedy paradigmatic of?

            Gnome – Oedipus’ self-asserting knowledge: master of his own destiny (dikezein?)

            Akouein – Knowledge that listens to and obeys some outside force (which Oedipus refuses to do).

             The tyrant and the seer – 2 kinds of knowledge meet in his body and his expulsion, his banishment is structurally necessary for Greek society.

            Pg 255: “Wanting to see for himself, he has seen himself…” blocks his ears and blinded. He is the object of his own transgression and punishment is carried out on his self, his own body. But he is a figure of transgressive knowledge.

            What is this transgression? Apart from sleeping with his mother. Pushing the divine law out of the city, replacing it with juridical law, taking the place of the Gods. He wants disinterested knowledge but as the sovereign he cannot be seeking knowledge on this new model and not exercising power at the same time. His action of trying to know himself comes into conflict with his power.

            Knowledge by witness – knowledge by facts: ends up corresponding to the oracular – the knowledge of the Gods.

            This particular kind of knowledge is dangerous. The danger of knowledge. Knowledge becomes dangerous when you attempt to control it. Everything about Oedipus is too much. Banishment – social form of blindness. Blinding himself – double blindness: can’t see so can’t be seen. It’s not about trying to get into Oedipus’ head (not psychological) but looking at all these external elements. Incest taboo is also pushed to the side.

            Along with Oedipus disinterested knowledge is banished. What is enforced is the order of the Gods. Where does the purely disinterested knowledge come back in? Creon represents the law. Antigone is speaking to the Gods and trying to mobilize that power against Creon. But Antigone gets killed, though Creon does not win (Gods have the last say), his wife and son commit suicide. The law of the Gods gets reinstantiated. Antigone prevails in enforcing the law of the Gods.

            Sphinx – warner for trying to know who you are. Oedipus ignores the warning. He’s definitely transgressing. He’s trying to have the knowledge of Gods without actually listening to them. As a tyrant there is also an excess of power. He’s excessive and trangressive because he represents knowledge as his own power and not knowledge of order of things/disinterested knowledge. Power to order the world. Knowledge of the order of the world given by the Gods, the seer – disinterested knowledge. Oedipus is mimicking Gods here in pretending that his knowledge is disinterested.

            Oedipus is too good at it – he does know, he figures it out. He’s so committed to figuring it out. It’s not ignorance and guilt, it’s not unconsciousness and desire. He’s not operating with a lack, he’s operating with a too muchness. Excess and transgression: fully Deleuzian. The three syntheses of time – third synthesis: the hero is destroyed because he’s overcome by this task as he overcomes it (a paradox).

            Is it too much because it’s so self-interested and so not disinterested? Figuring out he’s the object of the search and subject of it too. That’s what we’re not supposed to be in the later figuration of disinterested knowledge: knowledge is knowledge of something out there in the world, but here he’s propelling toward himself.

            Socrates: both the subject and object of his own search for knowledge, applying the dictum, “Know thyself.” Like Oedipus he gets expelled from the city. Yet Foucault wants Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle to be on the side of disinterested knowledge. Disinterestedness: subject standing back from power or knowledge of the disempowered (slave morality). No passion, disconnected from power.

            Oedipus has power to put things in order – he exercises power in knowing (not just because he owns the town, because power is not a capacity for Foucault). He’s so good at it that he undermines himself. He went too far. In the context of the play, he’s always already operating under the Olympian order in some way, but at the end his power is completely taken away from it, he’s stripped of it. It doesn’t matter he follows his own original rule (blind himself and exile himself), because Creon asks him to wait for the Gods’ decree.

            The disinterested knowledge here anticipates Plato and Aristotle. March 17 1971 Lecture (pg 197). Is Aristotelian knowledge sufficiently close to seer knowledge?

            Power/knowledge is thrown out as a pair, excluded. “We can learn by inquiring” – the play says: oh you better not know that way. Because that way is bound up with power. Disinterested knowledge (Aristotle) since it keeps its distance with power is okay, permissible. 2 possible readings: 1) Move from power/knowledge to disinterested knowledge is a move of power. (more metaphysical reading, more Nietzschean) Pg 155: “The semantic field cuts itself off as institution, as social break: philosophy, science, the discourse of truth [are]: independent of power, founders of power, critics of power. But it was in fact organized on the basis of power.” 2) Let’s grant that there is something like disinterested knowledge and do a genealogy of how that comes about. That knowledge bears the history of struggle with other forms of knowledge that explicitly affirm power. What are the conditions of possibility that knowledge is totally disarticulated from power? Not exercise of power, but exercise of knowledge bound up with power.

            It’s not like after Oedipus knowledge was no longer related to power. There is still power at work. There is no basis, no ground, but knowledge is always produced in its interplay with power. Which doesn’t make them any less true. There is power operating there but that does not make it untrue. Power is not oppressive.

            Chronologically: Written around the same time as Socrates and Plato are running around. 30 years before Socrates was executed. For Nietzsche, Sophocles represents pre-disinterested knowledge.

            Homer’s contest – Nietzsche: old Homeric form of truth & it was lost through Socrates.

Lecture on Nietzsche, April 1971

We first generated a list of discussion questions:

•  p. 217 - Foucault wants to use Nietzsche to think a history of truth without relying on truth.  What are the distinctions between "truth," and "truth without truth"?
• p. 209 - Is a Nietzschean/Foucaultian genealogy of knowledge reliant on a rump materialism/biologism?
• What are the various senses of knowledge that Foucault discusses in this chapter?
• What is Foucault attacking here, via Nietzsche?  Particularly, what swatch of political philosophy is Foucault critical of (doesn't seem like just Aristotle)?
• p. 216 - What is the relationship that Foucault posits between violence and knowledge, and violence and error?
• p. 214 - What does it mean that knowledge-connaissance freed from the subject-object relation is knowledge-savoir?  

Subject Headings of Nietzsche Lecture

• I. Invention of Knowledge (202-208)
• II. What is Knowledge Before Truth? (208-214)
• III. The Event of Truth (214-219)
• 1. Will to Truth
• 2. Paradoxes of Will to Truth

We then discussed:

• Nietzsche's claim that knowledge is an invention, that knowledge does not precede itself, this seems to be a direct contradiction of an entire philosophical tradition, from Aristotle to Descartes to Locke.
• Although does Nietzsche contradict himself here when he traces knowledge to biological instincts and need?
• Perhaps Nietzsche's use of need here is an instrumental tool of critique.  And "need" is not just about preservation, but also about "flourishing," "becoming."
• What is knowledge prior to truth?  The need to unveil, to transgress something.  Also the need to preserve and grow.  Only after the invention of these knowledges is ascetic knowledge invented - truth - which suppresses the point of view of the body and erases partialities and limits.
• F says that Nietzsche wanted to put difference between the categories of subject and object, but this seems like a bad metaphor.  The point is that subject and object are the products of knowledge.
• How is Foucault using the term violence here?  In a metaphysical sense?  Physical sense?  Not just physical violence - fisticuffs, etc. - but also psychical violence.
• For N, the will to know is not an expression of knowledge or truth, but - simply - an expression of a will. 
• So F's critique is of any mode of disinterested knowledge.  Nietzsche is a key figure for breaking away from this mode of knowledge.
• Why does Foucault never go "meta"?  Following Nietzsche, likely never saw a particular problem in value claims - unavoidable.

Lectures on the Will to Know 3 Mar, 10 Mar, 17 Mar

NOTE: MEETING NEXT WEEK IS AT NORMAL 2:00-3:30 TIME.

The group began as per usual with questions... Our focus mostly was on Ch. 12 (17 Mar, 1971 lecture)...

1. What is it about writing that enables the shift of truth from effect to cause?  Why writing?  (p. 153)

2. Foucault speaks of 'the individual' on p. 175.  Does this ancient individual anticipate the modern disciplinary individual?  Does Foucault here in 1971 anticipate Foucault in 1975?  Or both?

3. How is death function here (p. 176)?  How does this anticipate later Foucault?

4. How does the discussion of truth in the lectures (p. 187) anticipate some of the later work on the ethics of truth?  Not only in the late ethics, but also in the Psychiatric Power lectures?  And what is the genealogy of truth here?

5. How do we connect the idea of the fictitious place of truth (on which power is founded) from pp. 193 to the earlier discussion of sophism?

6. Foucault develops a genealogical perspective, or at least a description of one, in lecture 12 at the end of the series -- see pp. 194-5.  Is the genealogical approach being described here adequate to the analyses that came before?  Is this supportable?  Were the earlier analyses genealogical, or more structural?  Were they both genealogical and structural(ist)?

7. Foucault ends the lectures with a discussion of four Nietzschean principles (p. 198).  With respect to the principle of exteriority, Foucault says that he will not analyze the text on the basis of the text itself.   Is this adequate to the lectures that preceded?

Discussion then ensued....

1) How does writing effect the shift from effect of discourse to cause of discourse?  Truth as "effect" to truth as "condition" (155).  How does it shift from outcome of struggle to an idea of law/truth/justice as something that makes struggle unnecessary (Aristotle)?  Foucault's claim is not that writing effects this shift all on its own, but is part of a whole network of supports (cf. the quip on p. 150 against Derrida).

2) Why does Foucault shift the next year from the topos of antiquity to that of modernity?  Why abandon the 1971 project on the Greeks?  (Perhaps: it's not the proper object of inquiry for the methodological emphasis on struggle he is trying to develop.)

3) Methodological shifts...

  ... From hermeneutics to genealogy: "I have never tried to analyze the text on the basis of the text itself" (p. 198).  Foucault not against interpretation but rather against interpretation-ism.  How is Foucault moving outside of the text?

This has effects for the terms of the debate between Derrida and Foucault (see Foucault's quip on p. 198 against Derrida -- "get rid of textuality").

Will to Know, Lectures 17 Feb. and 24 Feb., 1971

The group began, as per its custom, with questions

Why the focus on Ancient Greece?  What is the point or even urgency of that particular focus?  One gets the impression that money has its origins in Greek antiquity, but why is Foucault not focusing on emergence of money elsewhere.

What is the relation between will to know and will to truth?  Is Foucault associating justice with truth and knowledge with power?  (See p. 120.)  Are these two different types of wills?  What is the relation between them?

What is Foucault's relation to Marx here?  Why is he sometimes giving Marxist explanations and at other times giving non-Marxist explanations?  Why the invocation of class conflict in one moment (p. 127) and then in the next more non-Marxist modes of inquiry (p. 142 where money is treated non-economically but more ritualistically)?

Discussion ensued... and it went like this...

Why the Greeks and only the Greeks?  Foucault does invoke Eastern sources here ("Asia", p. 118) but he doesn't go into the Asian Empires.  Why doesn't Foucault's genealogy get further back into the status of monetary measure in the East?  Foucault is focused on how the Greeks transformed their inheritance.  Is Foucault's focus here still primarily archaeological?  Is he trying to give a picture of 'Greek society'.  And yet it is proto-genealogical because within that static frame he is trace intra-arche transformations.

Turning to Foucault's discussion of money... We distinguished a few aspects...

Money as simulacrum (140ff.).

• Money is not a "symbol" (that 'points'?) but nor is it a "sign" (that 'represents') of an absent commodity
• Money is a "simulacrum" (that substitutes)

We discussed this and came up with a contemporary example or two.  Do carbon credits function as simulacra (of 'being ethical')?   What about payment for indulgences (for sins to be forgiven)?

Money as measure (142ff.).

• Money as measure enables a truth or establishes a truth (143)
• And this is linked to the production of justice (143)

Money is linked to truth not because it expresses the truth of value (that would be money as representative 'sign') but because it expresses the truth that is linked to justice.  The truth of money is justice.  Or is it a simulacrum of justice?  Yes, if we think of justice in terms of balance, order.  This is exactly the conception of justice Foucault has been tracing, under the heading of dikaion (related to krinein, not to dikazein; see lecture from 10 Feb 1971).

Money is a simulacrum of justice in the sense of dikaion, or a practice of justice that "becomes organization of the world" (110).  Money is a simulacrum of order.  It effects a substitution for order.

This brought us back to Foucault's discussion of justice and truth (and knowledge and power)...

Foucault discusses "two correlative transformations: truth becomes knowledge of things, knowledge shifts from domain of power to the region of justice (119).

Knowledge goes from a secret domain of mastery connoting power to a space that is twofold: it is both a space of truth and it is connected to justice.

Knowledge poses itself as disconnected from power, in become truthful and just, but the connection of knowledge and power remains in the background: "the Western fable has it that the thread of desire and innocence breaks the alliance between this power and this knowledge" (120).

Will to Know, Lectures, 3 Feb. & 10 Feb. 1971

We began as per usual with questions:

What is Foucault's relation to Hegel here, esp. Hegel's analysis of Antigone in the Phen. Geist?

How is Foucault parsing the two Greek conceptions of justice: krinein, dikazein (see 88-90, 101)?  How does dikazein give way to krinein?  Does Foucault want to explain their transformation (genealogy) or does he aim to parse their difference (archaeology)?

How does dike-dikaion related to the two forms of justice?

What is the role of music and song in the judicial discourse (briefly mentioned by Foucault, p. 95)?

Is there a relation to Nietzsche in the discussion of debtor relationships?

Discussion the ensued:

Parsing the terms:

• Dikazein has to do with struggle between litigants.
• Krinein has to do with truth in the form of external judging: memory, disclosure of truth, exercise of sovereignty (109).
• Dike-dikaion is connected to krinei not dikazein.

"Disclosure of the truth and exercise of sovereignty are interdependent and jointly replace the indication of the agonist and the risk he voluntarily accepts" (109).  Truth in the form of knowledge and being replace truth as the outcome of struggle.

What effects the transformation to krinein?  "A whole new set of economic relationships" (107), "Writing" (108), political technologies of "the State and the administrative system" such as calendars, "measure", "royal power" and "magical-religious structure" (111).  In this network of conditions, can we discern proto-genealogy?  Are all of these on the same level?  Is the appeal to 'economic relationships' as "underlying" reductive?  What about the appeals to techniques of the state?  Does Foucault yet have the methodological equipment in place to conceptualize a network or an apparatus as a motor of historical transformation?

Will to Know Lectures - 13 Jan. 1971 & 27 Jan. 1971

The group began, as per our usual practice, with questions:

1) How exactly is Foucault periodizing the various eras of Greek thought he is here considering?  What are the historical relations between the archaic period, the classical age, the sophists, and the philosophers?

2) Why the Greeks, Monsieur Foucault?  (Consider p. 67 and Foucault's assertion of continuity from the Greeks to us.)

3) How does Platonic phil. differ from Sophistry, for Foucault?  (See p. 67).

4) What is truth as it emerges in Foucault's investigation into its emergence?  If truth is emergent, is it made up?  If there is truth, then what is it for Foucault? (See. p. 73-75)

5) Foucault suggests that true statements, in order to be true, must neutralize their status as events, their materiality, etc..  How do the intentions of the sophist versus those of the philosopher condition this neutrality?  (See p. 60).

6) Is there a normative evaluation on Foucault's part here of the pre-philosophical sophists?

Discussion ensued:

We began with a discussion of philosophy's attempt to purify itself in Aristotle.  We asked about the extent to which we can trace contemporary (1971) philosophy to the classical philosophy of the Greeks.  Aristotle, says Foucault, is "the point of view that still commands us" (67).  Is Foucault here tracing an unbroken line from the Greeks to the present?  In response, it was suggested that Foucault is characterizing philosophy in terms of exclusion, and so if those exclusions persisted through to the present Foucault is trying to gain a view of how philosophy depends on exclusions.

We then discussed the exclusion by Aristotelian discourse of intention, will, desire.  How is Aristotle excluding the Sophist?  And with what interests?  Is the exclusion of the sophistical itself a philosophical move?

What is the relation of judicial limits on truth to, apophantic philosophical discourse?  Do the two phases of judicial discourse anticipate philosophical and sophistical discourse, respectively?

Will to Know Lectures - 16 Dec. 1970 & 6 Jan. 1971

First we aired out our questions:

• 26 - Is the Kantian dilemma the same as the transcendental-empirical?
• 24-25 - How is truth different from knowledge?
• 27 - What does Foucault mean by Nietzsche's "positivism"?
• What is the relationship between the Kantian dilemma and sophism?
• 38 - What is Aristotle excluding in order to make philosophical knowledge possible?
• 31-32 - What does it mean to say that "truth...is in principle linked to knowledge, but both exist in a relation to each other of both support and exclusion"?
• 27 - Why does Foucault want to kill Spinoza?

Then worked through discussion:

• Spinoza seems to ground the quest for truth in the pursuit of happiness; for Aristotle, the quest for truth is simply the result of an innate desire.  Both, Foucault seems to be arguing, are idealists, and therefore must be surpassed.
• Foucault seems to be excavating from both Aristotle and Spinoza the notion that knowledge is worth pursuing because it makes us happy.
• For Nietzsche, the desire for knowledge is simply one configuration that desire might take.
• Foucault talking about positivism in terms of Comte, most likely.  Idea is that one can't assert anything without grounding it in empirics.  Nietzsche, in Human, All Too Human, appears to be a positivist - Foucault is suggesting that Nietzsche has a positivist theme (but it needn't be overcome).
• Foucault suggests that the Sophist is "outside," in the history of philosophy.  Meaning, possibly, that the Sophist rejects the identification of truth and knowledge.
• Aristotle accuses the sophists of excluding truth from debate, but Foucault is suggesting that Aristotle himself is attempting to exclude sophistical reasoning from debate.

Lectures on the Will to Know – 9 Dec. 1970

 We began by refreshing the material we covered last term, and offering some questions we had for the current reading:

I.               Refresher on The Order of Discourse

a.     Theme of exclusions

b.     Where are we picking up?

                                               i.     F’s turn to practices.

II.              Questions

a.     What is the significance of Foucault’s distinction between savoir and connaissance as he introduces these terms in these lectures?

b.     Is the will to know in modernity for an “animal”-kind of knowing, since it is concerned with means, and is ancient knowledge of a higher form, since it is concerned only with ends?

c.     How does the will to truth exercise itself “on other discourses” as well as “on…other practices” that are external to discourse?

d.     What does Foucault mean by his definitions of savoir and connaissance as given on pg. 17?

e.     Is Foucault setting up a causal relationship between desire and knowledge in his first lecture?

We then turned to further discussion:

 

III.            Discussion

a.     Distinction between savoir/connaissance

                                               i.     Definition her provides on pg. 17 seems less like a elucidation of the terms themselves, than with their relationship with desire.

                                             ii.     In Aristotle’s connaissance, desire and knowledge are “co-natural”, they are part of the same process.  Foucault’s savoir, by contrast, is the pulling of desire out from knowledge, showing that we have a will to produce knowledge.

b.     Question of Aristotle’s elision of instrumentality from knowledge.

                                               i.     Foucault seems to be arguing that, from Aristotle on, the notion that knowledge can be non-utilitarian – or sufficient unto itself – covers over some pre-existing will or desire to know, or to know in order to do or be something.

c.     To what extent are the observations Foucault outlines in this lecture needed and/or useful?

                                               i.     Are Foucault’s observations here merely preliminary notes on his later work on power/knowledge, or is he advancing something new and interesting here?

Winter Reading Schedule

Foucault's "Lectures on the Will to Know"

ORIGINAL/OLD
...
Wk 1 - Ch. 1
Wk 2 - Chs. 2 & 3
Wk 3 - Chs. 4 & 5
Wk 4 - Chs. 6 & 7
Wk 5 - Chs. 8 & 9
Wk 6 - Chs. 10 & 11
Wk 7 - Chs. 12 & 13
Wk 8 - "Oedipal Knowledge" (Mar 1972)

UPDATED/REVISED
...
Feb 6 (wk 5) - Lectures 8 & 9 (pp. 116-148)
Feb 13 (wk 6) - Lecture 11 end & Lecture 12 (pp. 175-201) + skim Lectures 10 & 11
Feb 20 (wk 7) - Oedipal Knowledge appendix (Mar 72 lecture; similar to Lecture 12)
Feb 27 (wk 8) - Lecture 13 (pp. 202-223) - April 1971 lecture at McGill
Mar 6 (wk 9) - no meeting but discuss (via email?) plans for next term -
suggestions include our own work?, further texts by Foucault from 1969
to 1973, secondary literature on archaeology and genealogy (Davidson,
Hacking, Bernauer, Gutting), current/recent attempts to make use of
Foucault's genealogies
Mar 13 (wk 10) - no meeting