Foucault 1979 CdF, Chapter 3, 24 Jan 1979

This session began with a few questions from around the table. Foucault argues that the historical shift from mercantilist to liberal discursive practices is defined in part by the growing rejection of a zero-sum economic theory in favor of an economic doctrine that is characterized by a general assumption of mutual enrichment. Is this a fair description of this discursive shift that began to take hold in the 18^th century? Second question: does Foucault treat terms such as “liberalism” and “colonialism” as historically situated in the same way that “sex(uality)” is argued to be a historically-specific concept in The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1? The first question was never directly returned to—perhaps this line of thought will be pursued in later meetings. The second question regarding the historically-situated nature of Foucault’s concepts set the direction of the meeting.

Through reference to such texts as The Archaeology of Knowledge, “What is Enlightenment?”, Discipline and Punish, and the first two lectures of the current reading, the group reached consensus that discourses and practices, as Foucault understands them, should be grasped at the level of the historical and contingent conditions that allow for true and false claims to be made. “Freedom”, for instance, should not be understood as a universal concept that can be measured according to a single quantitative standard across different moments and places. No, there are only multiple instantiations of “freedom” that differ qualitatively and possibly incommensurably, from one historical occurrence to the next. Foucault’s method is thus to begin with the practices and discourses themselves through which to understand the use of such universal phrases rather than to engage in the more common practice of assuming the universal givenness of a concept such as “freedom” and explaining specific practices and discourses according to this predetermined mold.

The interconnectedness of “nature” and “freedom” within the emergence of the liberal discursive framework was employed by the reading group as an example of the historically-specific nature of the meaning of such terms.

This discussion led to a debate regarding the purpose of Foucault’s genealogical work. Is it the case that Foucault meant to study practices and discourses in their particular historicity in order to “unmask” the true meaning and intent lying just underneath the surface of events? Or is it the case that such an unmasking only reveals another mask, behind which is yet another ad infinitum? That behind the masks of a particular discourse or practice lay only further layers of historically-specific frameworks of meaning? Through reference to other texts of Foucault, our group agreed to the second interpretive option. But if we reject that Foucault was engaged in the straightforwardly liberationist project of unmasking the hidden and true nature of things behind the façade of historical practices, what should we understand the value of Foucault’s approach to be? Perhaps, as one member suggested, it is to allow for the reframing of currently extant debates, if nothing else.

This discussion quickly became a metaphilosophical debate regarding the value of history to philosophy. Does philosophy need history? What is the philosophical justification for focusing on the history of concepts rather than simply doing analytic philosophy? It is not exactly clear how John Rawls, for instance, would have benefitted from an extensive amount of historical research. As someone suggested, perhaps history is indispensible to philosophy when one considers that the subject matter of philosophy is inherently historical. Had we not run out of time, we might have solved this question once and for all.