Tuesday, March 9, 2021

Delaporte, pp. 115-117 + pp. 139-176 (Ch. 7): 3/4 meeting

 

Questions: 

1) Let’s examine the five points addressing methodology on pp. 148-149. Can we make sure we understand each point? How might these points connect with our discussion of method from last week?

2) What does Delaporte mean by “actual practices” (also on pp.148-9)?

3) Given it was not a bacteriological concept, what was the operative conception of germ in 1832? The term “virus" is also mentioned in the text. How were viruses and germs distinguished?

4) Is the methodology outlined on pp.148-9 meant to be specific to the argument of the book or are the points more generalizable in scope? 

5) In reference to point 5 on method:  How is what Delaporte calls a “common matrix” similar to or different from what Foucault called epistemological-juridical processes? Can we unpack the relation between the two?  

6) A group member is interested in the idea of metaphorical space found on page 157. We are given examples such as the stench of dying and morbid (human) specimens which are growing plants. How is metaphor working here? Is it of methodological or theoretical significance?

7) Can we please map out the critique of Ackerknecht’s method? (begins on p. 145)

8) Let’s consider the relationship between practices and seeing elaborated on p. 170. Remembering what we know about seeing from Birth of the Clinic, what about seeing is specific to Delaporte here? What does Delaporte take from or do with BoC insights about seeing/vision and medical history?   

The discussion was structured around the five methodological points on pp. 148-9:

Point 1

- “Motive” is a useful term because it is not as laden with individual intention. But what is the word tactical doing here? Why use the word tactical? Why not just ask about “results”? 

- The pairing of a notion of the repressive hypothesis versus thinking about the production of new categories and concepts comes to mind here. This connects to the distinction between repressive and productivist. Recall Foucault in HS v.1 and his description of the emergent Bourgeoisie as trying to produce themselves. 

- When Delaporte notes that by looking at practices he is not concerned with the subjective intentions of actors, perhaps there is a bit of a productivist lens working which wonders what these intentions produce.

Point 2

- All his methodological points seem to be tethered to the time period he is investigating. This raises questions about the generalizability and/or universalizability of his theory. These are two different things. That is, there is a difference between (1) saying something is useful in other contexts and (2) making a metaphysics of something (e.g. saying these are the methods one needs when doing history).

- Class antagonism is a feature of the analysis but it is not the only explanatory variable. A kind of Foucaultian genealogy pulling from Marx?

 Point 3

- There is an interesting discussion on p.170 about two distinct ways of seeing. City versus rural. The city sees populations and the rural sees individuals. 

- But Delaporte doesn’t seem to want to assert any kind of a priori antagonisms. That is, do not go into looking at rural or urban medicine thinking form the start that there are substantial differences between them. Rather, observe the practical differences between them. 

- This is a methodological point about focusing on difference rather than antagonism when doing social analysis.

Point 4

- “objects defined by types of experience” seem different from practices. What is the relation between (1) objects modeled by experience and (2)concepts?

- Is there a kind of scientific holism operative here?

- It seems like all of these points are basically motivated by the claim that things we normally use to explain stuff in the history of disease should actually be avoided. Do not look at obvious political divisions, do not look personal intentions, do not look at popular accounts of  disease...There are other ways to talk about disease than these meta-categories (also these meta-categories themselves are perhaps what need explaining).

Point 5

- In terms of “this common matrix,” Delaporte seems to be accounting for these changes in a more Foucauldian style of “diagrams.” It is not all power; it is all not knowledge; it is both.

- Recalling the quote discussed last week (“Diseases do not exist, only practices”), what about viruses and instances of disease that are not as obviously socially constructed? There is much to say about this question. Ultimately, though, Delaporte is a hardcore social constructivist in Hackings’ sense.

- Practices are about identifying the epistemological factors necessary to write the kind of history that he (Delaporte) wants to write. In this way, what constitutes a practice is inseparable from the history that he is writing.

- There is much to say about the realism and non-realism debate! Regrettably we did not solve the debate during our session. 

 

 

Thursday, February 25, 2021

Delaporte, Dis & Civ, Intro & Ch. 3

 

We began, as per usual, with questions:

1)      Let’s discuss methodological remarks in the introduction.  “What does exist is not disease but practices” (6).  What does FD mean here?  How does it fit in with the three planks of the standard view that he rejects?

2)      Related methodological questions about whether his account of what might be called “the social construction of disease” and any potential idealism.  Relatedly what is the relation between power and knowledge in Delaporte, especially in comparison to his remarks about ideology (8-9)?

3)      How is he classifying certain kinds of beliefs, statements?  Especially when he uses terms like “myth” and “ideology” and “values” and “fantasy”?

4)      FD discusses in ch. 3 surveillance.  He discusses “the opposition opposition degredation/surveillance” (62).

5)      How is FD mapping what we might call “false beliefs” to “class antagonism”?  How does it map to “rural” versus “urban” divides?  (How does this relate to his nervousness about “class antagonism” as a category in the intro?)

6)      How does FD use “fear” as a category of analysis such that fear can be shown to be productive in these settings? (60-61).

7)      Relatedly, how do these fears (& other kinds of beliefs and epistemic statuses) play out as meaningful, or be meaningful, in social contexts, and in classed ways?

 

We turned first to issues in methodology:

We first considered some of the background of contagionist theory (1700s-1800s) versus infectionist theory (1800s), both of which were elaborated prior to the concept of the germ.  See p. 14 for one reference.

To understand “disease” we need to situate it in practices.

o   FD rejects a three-prong medical philosophy articulated on p. 6 (cf. MF on “sex itself” in HSv1)

o   FD endorses then three methodological precepts: 1) social factors appear in contexts of study, 2) different underlying “styles of medical reasoning”, 3) there are different theories of disease (infection v. contagion)

·        We then ran through pp. 6-8 to discuss how FD rejects principles #2 and #3, and how he would endorse a more moderated version of each if it were emptied of the presuppositions embedded into them by principle #1.

 

Discussing, then, chapter 3:

·        Is the treating “beliefs” symmetrically with the way he thinks about “disease”?  He places a good amount of weight on whether the beliefs are true or false, rather than just taking the positivity of their appearance as a datum for analysis.

o   For Foucault (as a positivist) what matters is not the truth-value of the belief, but rather the fact of their appearance.

o   Is Delaporte following Foucault here?  Or is his argument resting on the falseness of the belief as somehow explanatory?

o   (Cf. Arendt on truth versus the lie)