Foucault/Derrida exchange

The group begins with the context of Derrida’s paper and the break between the two philosophers. The discussion proceeds with (I) the analysis of Descartes’ passages quoted in Foucault, (II) Foucault’s reading of these passages, and (III) Derrida’s critique of Foucault.

I. Madness in Descartes:

The group has difficulty in dealing with Descartes, having not read him recently. The members identify, however, that the discussion of madness (in relation to doubt) precede cogito.

II. Foucault’s reading of Descartes

Foucault’s argument: the exclusion of madness from the discourse of reason – an act of silencing. This happens with the distinct way in which Descartes overcomes errors such as dreams. What differentiates madness from, say, dreams?

           

1. Body: in dreams I have a sense of body and a control of my body, albeit deranged or distended, whereas in madness the body doesn’t belong to me.

2. Recoverability: Dreams are subject to errors that can be corrected (confusion, illusion, etc.). When I wake up my deranged and distended body is corrected, whereas madness remains uncorrected. Errors outside reason can’t be corrected; therefore, madness is external to reason.

Then, one cannot suppose one is mad, for the condition of possibility of having the thought of madness is reason.

The group thinks that Foucault might be reading back cogito these passages, while Descartes is still developing the concept of doubt.

III. Derrida’s critique of Foucault

Derrida’s argument: one can’t do a historical/social analysis of madness as a concept or idea.

Madness as an absent present drives philosophical discourse. It is a motivating principle of the philosophical project as the essential other of discourse. It is in opposition to speech (65). It is before language and discourse; it is that which we do violence.

Thus, when we talk about it we’re putting the straightjacket to madness, incorporating it into discourse. This is what Foucault does, as he is speaking within discourse and thus reason. Therefore, by bracketing madness Descartes is more sincere than Foucault who takes it up, assuming that you can talk about it. Descartes in fact performs the reality of madness in the philosophical discourse.

The group acknowledges the deconstructionist tendencies that Derrida would later develop, agreeing with certain aspects of his critique. And yet, how Derrida’s intervention contributes to (or even relates to) the general discussion of the containment of the mad man or Foucault’s larger project is undetermined.