Foucault, "Discourse on Language" (1971)

We began the session with several questions, many of them relating to the concept of truth:

1.     Would it be useful to map out the text, basically?

2.     Foucault suggests that “it is always possible one could speak the truth in a void” (224).  Is this possible and/or consistent with his philosophical project?

3.     Does Foucault understand himself to be a “monster on the prowl,” in the sense that he is speaking the truth, but not within the discursive framework of his time (223-224)?

4.     How does Foucault himself fit within his own definition of “the author”?  Is he an author, or fictional, as he suggests “authors” in fact are?

5.     What is the relationship between the author-function and spoken language?  Is there a difference between the truth that can be found in written narratives, and truth that is spoken?

6.     What does it mean to say that “the theme of the founding subject permits us to elide the reality of discourse” (227)?

7.     Foucault talks about logophobia and logophilia (228-229), which is strange since he rarely speaks of affect.  How is this significant?

We then outlined a sketchy framework of Foucault’s method in the lecture:

1.     Three sets of procedures to regulate/control discourse:

a.     External Exclusions

                                               i.     Prohibitions:

1.     Objects

2.     Rituals

3.     Expertise

                                             ii.     Divisions/rejections

1.     Oppositions btw. reason/madness, e.g.

                                            iii.     Will to Truth

b.     Internal Rules

                                               i.     Commentary

                                             ii.     Author

                                            iii.     Disciplines

c.     Rarefaction among speaking subjects

                                               i.     Ritual

                                             ii.     Fellowships of discourse

                                            iii.     Doctrine

                                            iv.     Social appropriation of discourse

2.     Several reinforcements of these regulations within modern philosophy

a.     Indicts Cartesians, phenomenologists, and Hegelianism

3.     Methodological principles to counter discursive regulations:

a.     Eventually yields two analytic methods: critical and genealogical (critical here seems to mean archaeological)

4.     Ends with hagiography of Hyppolite.

We then opened up into a broader discussion of Foucault’s aims, especially concerning the phrase Will to Truth:

1.     What does Will to Truth mean?  Why is it a will to truth, not the production of truth?

a.     We then debated whether Foucault is lamenting the production of truth in our modern discourse, and nostalgic for its production in, for instance, ancient Greece.

2.     We asked, finally, what the “goal” is in unearthing and explaining our modern Will to Truth.

a.     Two central themes emerged: Foucault’s project could be seen as descriptive, but also (or either) as an act.  That is, he could be read as describing the rules and regulations of discourse, but also of trying to modify that discourse insofar as he describes it in his archaeological manner.