Hacking, Chs. 17-19

The best idea in Chapter 17 is... that Nietzsche did not infer (or argue for) chance (148), but rather "he experienced it".  This suggests that chance, and the taming of it, has less to do with an argument against determinism, and more to do with a new positive and productive way of experiencing, seeing, &c..  But the chapter remained difficult for us at the end of discussion... What could it mean to say that "Necessity and chance are twinned" (148)?

The best idea in Chapter 18 is... that determinism of the twentieth-century micro-physics stripe is an invention of the 1870s (Cassirer)... but that there is another (older) kind of determinism that "excluded statistical law" (152).  It is this kind of determinism that the book tracks in its story of "the erosion of determinism".

[There was discussion, albeit tentative, about the taming of chance as emerging positively in its own right producing only as an after-effect the erosion of determinism, rather than the taming of chance as attempting to negate determinism.  Rather, statistics leaves the metaphysics of determinism-voluntarism (the question of free will) "outside our province" (Durkheim, quoted on p. 159).]

The best idea in Chapter 19 is... "Nothing is more commonplace than the distinction between fact and value. From the beginning of our language the word 'normal' has been dancing and prancing all over it" (163). The idea of the normal is both descriptive and prescriptive.

[And thus the normal, perhaps, is beyond the debate, or problematic, of determinism and voluntarism.]

Hacking, chs 14-16

The best idea in chapter 14 is... an explanation of the distinction between penchant (propensity, disposition) and determining cause (fatalism) (cf. 123).  This distinction helps resolve a worry about statistical fatalism. The worry arises because of a tension between a 'metaphysical' and a 'political issue (cf. 121).  The tension is that on the one side we have an enormous political success in altering social conditions to improve various aspects of life, health, crime, etc., and then on the other side this political success seems to undermine our standard sense of moral (or metaphysical) agency.  The distinction between propensity and determination helps resolve this tension as follows.  The political success of social reform operates on propensities of actors; it does not compel actors or necessitate anything; it is probabilistic.  This can be construed as leaving intact a metaphysics and morality of freedom; this is because social reform posits propensities not necessities.

The best idea in chapters 15 and 16 are... tbd.

Hacking, Taming, chs. 11-13

The most important idea in chs. 11 and 12 has to do with... the distinction between objective (frequency) probability and subjective (degree of belief) probability, as one entree to the gradual erosion of determinism.  See the chart below:

A second important idea in the discussion, though not necessarily in the chapters themseslves, concerns the erosion across the 19th century of, perhaps, determinism (represented by idealism) and essentialism (represented by persisting classical empiricisms).  Is the 'natural kinds' project then a companion to the 'probability and chance' project?

The most important idea in ch. 13 is ... the story of how Quetelet takes the idea of statistical mean and transforms it into a real quantity.  "This is a crucial step in the taming of chance. It began to turn statistical laws that were merely descriptive of large-scale regularities into laws of nature and society that dealt in underlying truths and causes."

Hacking, 'Taming', chs. 9-10

The best idea in Chapter 9 is... that, "A category of problems--pretty much what we now call 'social problems'--was created to be shared by joint experts, medical and legal" (76).


The best idea in Chapter 10 is... the idea of a distinction between statistics, statistical law, and statistical inference (10).  There is a rough chronology that first come statistics, then come laws of statistics, then come statistical inferences.  Is there also a conceptual/rational connection here?  Or is there a 'statistical style of reasoning' involving statistical inference that would not necessarily take the form of law?  Is the conclusion of every inductive inference necessarily a conclusion in the form of a law?