1. Foucault's use of habit to describe disciplinary power? How do we understand its critical use?
2. What is the relationship between genealogy and habit? Particularly, the "change" of habit.
3. Fleshing out distinctions between ideology and "strategies of power"?
4. Can we track the four theoretical schemas of power? (pp. 228 - 229, 231, 233).
5. What is an "institution" for Foucault? How does this differ from something like "apparatus"? (p. 235).
Institution as social form? "... institutional condition of possibility..." (227). Institutions as "effects" of techniques, practices, knowledges -- Foucault's "nominalism." Institutions as something like "anticipatory dispositifs"?
Example:
power-knowledge ---> surveillance, examination, normalization ---> techniques(?) ---> institutions (e.g., prison, clinic, army, etc.).
Four schemas of power:
(1) power as exercised as opposed to appropriative (i.e., not a matter of possession)
(2) power as diffused as opposed to localized (centralized?)
(3) power as constitutive of production, not subordinate to it
(4) power as knowledge formation, not ideological (i.e., power-knowledge)
Who is Foucault mogging? Arguably, political philosophy hitherto.
(1) Hobbes and the social contract tradition.
(2) Althusser
(3) "post-Hegelians," i.e. (early) Marx
(4) Critical theory, i.e., Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse (and Althusser, again).
In terms of ideology, what is meant by "transparency" and "opacity." Against the idea that ideology distorts actual knowledge, whereas Foucault wants to suggest that we need not posit hidden motives and interests to understand the operations of power. Ideology critique as revealing how operations of power distort consciousness of subjects (false consciousness).
Foucault distinction between eighteenth-century and nineteenth-cenutury discourses. What's the exact nature of the shift? Foucault doesn't seem to be offering a comprehensive theory of habit -- wish he was saying more here.
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