Williams TNT Chapter 2

CGC Notes: 1-18-19

Williams - Genealogy

Questions:

1.      What is the import of non-genetic learning? Is this exclusive to homo-sapiens? What is the relevance to this for genealogy as a method.

2.      Is genealogy supposed to justify ethical naturalism (naturalist explanations), or is it part of a naturalist account?

3.      What is the relationship between explanation, justification and vindication for Williams?

4.      (32-24) Power of genealogy in introducing the idea of function where you wouldn’t expect it. How does this work? How to we get function out of fiction? What are the constraints on fiction such that it can introduce function?

5.      Where is the critical aspect of William’s account of genealogy?

6.      The distinction between history and abstraction: what is the status of genealogy as a kind of explanation?

7.      Does Williams get “vitalism” right, historically and conceptually? If not, is this significant. Compare with Canguilhem’s account of vitalism.

8.      “History” versus “matters of fact”. What does it mean to bring history into genealogical practice?

9.      What is the scope of imaginary genealogy? Why does it have to be strictly imaginary?

Discussion:

Naturalism:

·         Williams’ genealogy is specifying a particular version of naturalism (against other forms). His genealogical account is supposed to serve the new version of naturalism.

·         Williams offers a few different conceptions: not “scientific naturalism” understood as reduction. (23) Questions of naturalism are not about reductionism but about explanation. “Can we explain the phenomenon in question in terms of the rest of nature”. How is this distinct from reduction? Is reduction a metaphysical claim? Is Williams’ account more epistemological (doesn’t make a claim about what is real)? Different levels of explanation: “cannot tell ethological story without introducing culture” (23). Francois Jacob as giving a similar picture (Russian nesting dolls). Williams wants to leave questions open (unlike reductionists). Williams is talking about ethical naturalism.

·         Is Nietzsche’s genealogy of ethics an example? gives a natural account which can influence how we think about good/evil. Relationship between ethics and psychology (26). (See also page 22).

·         State of nature: Does Williams’ move to the study of the state of nature mark an important difference from Nietzsche? Strategic decision to talk about state of nature? Williams wants to discuss the status of genealogy as an explanation. Williams wants to look to state of nature accounts as a possible form of (non-causal) explanation. Does Williams think of the state of nature explanations of the state as genealogy? Discussion of Nozick (31). Something productive about the state of nature arguments for developing an account of genealogical explanation. One important difference: Craig, for Williams, comes along and asks what is knowledge for? Maybe this is a difference with respect to political philosophy: asking the question “what is a state for?” is obvious, whereas this is not the case for knowledge. Is the aim to justify a political system?

Explanation, Justification and Vindication:

·         Is vindication the same as justification? “One might accept Hume’s account… and still give justice… its same respect”

·         Imaginative can reveal a gap that can be filled with other values (39). What does it mean to say that imaginary genealogy reveals its own limitations?

·         Footnote 19: can genealogical explanation be such as to strengthen or weaken one’s confidence in them?

·         Is Williams saying the genealogy can fill various roles (vindication, subversion, etc.)? Or is there a “right” way of doing it? Is Nietzsche’s account satisfactory? It definitely leaves something out.

·         This book’s aim is ultimately vindicatory. This is because the state of nature introduces the idea of function.

·         Why not just give a functional account without the story? (Kitcher’s The Ethical Project)

·         Fiction and history are necessary and jointly sufficient for an adequate explanation?

Role of history:

·         Fills in gaps, extends genealogy, introduces the autonomy of the function (39-40).

Formalization of doing explanatory genealogy:

1.      Take a concept whose function is not obvious.

2.      Give a fictional account of the state of nature, where the function for that concept is located.

3.      Describe that location as one where everyone (in the state of nature) recognizes the function, and then that function becomes a reason for action.

4.      History fills in the gap and extend the story.

How does this not commit the genetic fallacy? How could the state of nature story every justify something. Is the explanation automatically vindicating? Even if the vindication falls apart, doing the historical excavation of the origins of collective reasons for action could still be useful.

If we can produce an abstract fictionalized model, then history provides a filling-in. Does this historical work fill in the abstract model? Or extend in terms of historical-temporal development? Can we think this in terms of form and content (fictionalized state of nature would give the form, history the content). Can history actually perform this role?

Is the state of nature an origin story?

Critical aspect Williams’ project: the turn to vindication erases the critical dimension involved with power (Martin Saar)

It seems lie Williams wants to give an account of the role of fictional genealogies. How are we supposed to choose between competing fictional accounts? Nozick’s, distinction between law and fact defective accounts might be helpful here.