Williams TT - Chapter 3

01/25/19

Chapter 3 – The State of Nature: A Rough Guide

Questions:

1.    How do all the things fit together in the chapter?

2.    Relationship between trust and language acquisition and family as an institution? P.49

3.    P.61 Why does the concept of truth have no history? “Truth as such” What would Foucault say to that?

4.    What makes this state of nature? Criteria?

5.    What is the basis or justification for the fictional account? P.52

6.    Plot/graph/chart where he stands vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Foucault

7.    Is he arguing that space and time are primitive concepts?

8.    What do we/Williams consider to be a technology in this case? P.49-50

9.    Is there power in the state of nature? Or does it come in with the real genealogy? 

10.  P. 57 – What is the concern of both local and objective past?

Discussion

State of nature as fictional model of society and then we kick over into real societies. 

The function of the fiction is to form a model that is then shown to map onto actual society?

Could this be a parallel or inversion of Peirce’s idea of truth – very end of inquiry 

Williams appealing to something in the opposite direction – what would we have to attribute to humans holding beliefs and opinions about things prior – hypothetical beginning of inquiry? 

Truth assertion and belief – concept of truth such that truth itself is unchanging – minimalist about truth – empty of content – function of truth is not changing -- 

Special thing about truth – tied to language, knowledge, assertion and belief – truth as a timeless notion 

p. 61 – why truth is the thing that emerges out of all that as the eternal? Why is it that truth is an unchanging thing that qualifies our capacity of language as opposed to other things?

Truth as ground for many other things...couldn’t meaning serve this role?

Truth as in analytical relation to many other things – assertion, belief, knowledge...

Genealogy of truth because it is denied. Whereas a genealogy of belief wouldn’t make sense because no one denies belief. 

Local conception of past – no history because there’s no period/interval – space and time you actually live – restriction – local conception of time and space

Objective conception of past – about contingency – why this history rather than another 

Commonality – they involve tenses 

Difference between local conception of the past and objective conception of the past – difference between time (before and after) and history (past and future) – 

Space – observational technology

Shared language, dry goods – environmental objects, animals – time, space, and indeterminacy, primitive trust, accuracy, sincerity, 

Where is the evolutionary biology in all of this if this is a naturalism? What relationship does evolutionary biology have to this account? Nature before culture? The state of nature part of the story is explicitly fictional – it can be fact defective so long as it’s not law defective. No evidence that it happened – p.31 

Truth only possible with a certain kind of entity (the human) – what would this account need to look like if he were accounting for other entities/animals 

Primitive – historically vs. logically – 

There must be culture in the state of nature, and that’s human – p.43

Why is this state of nature the best mythology for his genealogy?

What is put into the story that reveals things about our society – what we take for granted 

Harmfulness of his method of providing a fictional story or mythology? 

Easier to hook up an imaginary genealogy with a real history – not pretending to provide explanatory details as evolutionary developmental stories. 

Williams is frankly anthropocentric – 

What could we take Foucault to say about that such that they would agree? – about the timelessness of the concept of truth – truth as a stability against which things would vary – 

Foucault – tracking the history of the will to truth – why did truth become so important to these people? Why did the will to truth become so important? 

Existence of truth – Williams – internal conceptual relationships between truth, assertion, and belief

Explanatory value of the story

Foucauldians making peace with the transcendental Kantians 

Williams TNT Chapter 2

CGC Notes: 1-18-19

Williams - Genealogy

Questions:

1.      What is the import of non-genetic learning? Is this exclusive to homo-sapiens? What is the relevance to this for genealogy as a method.

2.      Is genealogy supposed to justify ethical naturalism (naturalist explanations), or is it part of a naturalist account?

3.      What is the relationship between explanation, justification and vindication for Williams?

4.      (32-24) Power of genealogy in introducing the idea of function where you wouldn’t expect it. How does this work? How to we get function out of fiction? What are the constraints on fiction such that it can introduce function?

5.      Where is the critical aspect of William’s account of genealogy?

6.      The distinction between history and abstraction: what is the status of genealogy as a kind of explanation?

7.      Does Williams get “vitalism” right, historically and conceptually? If not, is this significant. Compare with Canguilhem’s account of vitalism.

8.      “History” versus “matters of fact”. What does it mean to bring history into genealogical practice?

9.      What is the scope of imaginary genealogy? Why does it have to be strictly imaginary?

Discussion:

Naturalism:

·         Williams’ genealogy is specifying a particular version of naturalism (against other forms). His genealogical account is supposed to serve the new version of naturalism.

·         Williams offers a few different conceptions: not “scientific naturalism” understood as reduction. (23) Questions of naturalism are not about reductionism but about explanation. “Can we explain the phenomenon in question in terms of the rest of nature”. How is this distinct from reduction? Is reduction a metaphysical claim? Is Williams’ account more epistemological (doesn’t make a claim about what is real)? Different levels of explanation: “cannot tell ethological story without introducing culture” (23). Francois Jacob as giving a similar picture (Russian nesting dolls). Williams wants to leave questions open (unlike reductionists). Williams is talking about ethical naturalism.

·         Is Nietzsche’s genealogy of ethics an example? gives a natural account which can influence how we think about good/evil. Relationship between ethics and psychology (26). (See also page 22).

·         State of nature: Does Williams’ move to the study of the state of nature mark an important difference from Nietzsche? Strategic decision to talk about state of nature? Williams wants to discuss the status of genealogy as an explanation. Williams wants to look to state of nature accounts as a possible form of (non-causal) explanation. Does Williams think of the state of nature explanations of the state as genealogy? Discussion of Nozick (31). Something productive about the state of nature arguments for developing an account of genealogical explanation. One important difference: Craig, for Williams, comes along and asks what is knowledge for? Maybe this is a difference with respect to political philosophy: asking the question “what is a state for?” is obvious, whereas this is not the case for knowledge. Is the aim to justify a political system?

Explanation, Justification and Vindication:

·         Is vindication the same as justification? “One might accept Hume’s account… and still give justice… its same respect”

·         Imaginative can reveal a gap that can be filled with other values (39). What does it mean to say that imaginary genealogy reveals its own limitations?

·         Footnote 19: can genealogical explanation be such as to strengthen or weaken one’s confidence in them?

·         Is Williams saying the genealogy can fill various roles (vindication, subversion, etc.)? Or is there a “right” way of doing it? Is Nietzsche’s account satisfactory? It definitely leaves something out.

·         This book’s aim is ultimately vindicatory. This is because the state of nature introduces the idea of function.

·         Why not just give a functional account without the story? (Kitcher’s The Ethical Project)

·         Fiction and history are necessary and jointly sufficient for an adequate explanation?

Role of history:

·         Fills in gaps, extends genealogy, introduces the autonomy of the function (39-40).

Formalization of doing explanatory genealogy:

1.      Take a concept whose function is not obvious.

2.      Give a fictional account of the state of nature, where the function for that concept is located.

3.      Describe that location as one where everyone (in the state of nature) recognizes the function, and then that function becomes a reason for action.

4.      History fills in the gap and extend the story.

How does this not commit the genetic fallacy? How could the state of nature story every justify something. Is the explanation automatically vindicating? Even if the vindication falls apart, doing the historical excavation of the origins of collective reasons for action could still be useful.

If we can produce an abstract fictionalized model, then history provides a filling-in. Does this historical work fill in the abstract model? Or extend in terms of historical-temporal development? Can we think this in terms of form and content (fictionalized state of nature would give the form, history the content). Can history actually perform this role?

Is the state of nature an origin story?

Critical aspect Williams’ project: the turn to vindication erases the critical dimension involved with power (Martin Saar)

It seems lie Williams wants to give an account of the role of fictional genealogies. How are we supposed to choose between competing fictional accounts? Nozick’s, distinction between law and fact defective accounts might be helpful here.

Williams, T&T, Ch. 1

We began, as per usual, with questions:

Pg. 5 -- BW mentions "the party of common sense" as having a conception of truth.  What is that conception?

Pg. 5 -- Can we more fully flesh out the positions of the "deniers" or "subverters" and the "common sensists" about truth?

Pg. 12 -- BW refers to positivism as a default position.  What would positivism mean as a default position?

Pg. 12 -- How do we distinguish between BW's notion of "everyday truth" and his idea that positivism holds that "no interpretation is needed"?

Pg. 15 -- references to "these beliefs, "these conclusions," and "this antagonism" need clarification.

Pg. 2-3 -- Denunciation of history requires history -- what does he mean by history?

Pg. 2 -- Relationship between truth and authority.

Pg. 19 -- BW describes genealogy as a tripartite effort: fiction, history, and philosophy.  Is the concern about truthfulness a concern about the normativity of critique?  Is it really a concern about the normative foundations of critique?

Pg. 5 -- How can those of us who are committed to certain forms of Continental philosophy take BW's notion of the "skeptics," "subverters," and "deniers" (the latter is the term that BW wants) as plausible?  (This is not a rhetorical question.)


We then moved to discussion:

Williams at times too breezily engages certain figures or tendencies in contemporary thought (writing of "'deconstructive' histories" and scholarship that relies on a "mangling" of Saussure).  But is there a problem he has his finger on that doesn't rely on these kind of breezy engagements?

BW's definition of terms:
"Common sense" view -- this group doesn't think there is much of a problem about truth.  They deny that the value of the role that truth plays in our lives is "related to larger structures of thought" informed by social and political reality (6).  An extreme positivism, perhaps.

"Deniers" view -- They deny that there is "an essential role for the notion of truth in our understanding of language and of each other" (6).  They think we can hold on to the value of truthfulness without holding on to the value of truth.

Williams's view -- We need to ask about, and understand, the "value of truth" (6) in connection with [essential connection with?] the value of truthfulness -- and understand that value as historically complex, socially-loaded, and politically-fraught.   So BW wants to do justice to both "everyday truth" and "interpretive" historical narrative (9-10).

Williams's worry is motivated in part by a concern about the risks of the irrelevance of the humanities (3).

Wms's method -- genealogy as tripartite -- fiction + history + philosophy (19).  How do we understand this as methodology?  We'll get to this next week -- Chapter 2.