Nealon on Plants and Animals

This was a fantastic article, say we (or at least some of we).  Some thoughts…

If we operate with a distinction between concept & method (as discussed in the group before, namely ‘biopower’ is a concept and ‘genealogy’ is a method) it is clear that the entirety of Nealon’s argument is on the side of concept.  In other words, Nealon doesn’t address the question/issue of method, which is to say he doesn’t ask about how we might genealogically interrogate new or emergent biopolitical formulations.  So, the argument addresses concepts (C) of biopower but doesn’t address methods (M) of genealogy or archaeology.  This is not a criticism of Nealon (as if all that matters is (M)) but just an observation about where the argument is best located.

Within (C), Nealon asks about the extent to which biopower in Foucault already comprehends animality within its conceptual bounds.  The critique of Haraway’s argument against Foucault operates entirely on the conceptual level (this is not a criticism but an observation).  The debate is a debate between: ‘Foucault in his talk of biopower ignores biopower’ versus ‘Foucault in his talk of biopower does in fact discuss biopower’.  This is a debate, then, about the conceptual boundaries (and referents) of biopower as Foucault used the term.  This particular debate, then, shoves to the side a further methodological question about ‘how might we genealogically study emergent practices of animality?’

Within the frames of the conceptual debate, then, we have two positions: C1 (Haraway) and C2 (Nealon).  Again, leaving the methodology debate to the side, there is a further option for the debate located solely within the conceptual debate, namely option C3.  This option would split the diff between Haraway and Nealon, and suggest that Foucault’s discussions of biopower anticipate animality (with Nealon) but do not yet sufficiently comperehend it (with Nealon).

Does Foucault’s later disavowal of The Order of Things trouble this argument?

Does Nealon’s distinction between discipline as institutional and biopower as scattered beyond ‘institutional sites’ (and ‘virtually everywhere’) ? (p. 3) 

How does biopolitics incorporate animality itself?  This is addressed in the first half of the argument.  Animality is part of the story of the emergence of the concept of “life” or that which is the object of study of biology.  Biopolitical management of wolves as an examples.