1. Why does Allen need Foucault to be offering a determinate negation of the subject? Is this requisite for the project of integrating Foucaultian genealogy and Habermasian critical theory? If Foucault is not offering a determinate (rather than abstract) negation of the philosophy of the subject, then is there sufficient shared philosophical space between Foucault and Habermas to effect the sort of philosophical integration that Allen is working for? (Thus, we wondered, is there an implicit reliance in the text on the idea that the motor of critical theory is the determinate negation of philosophical conceptions.)
Is this account of Foucault as determinate negator sufficiently in touch with the Foucaultian-Deleuzian attempt to get out from under the logic of contradiction. See, for instance, Foucault’s review of Deleuze’s 1968 and 1969 books, or Foucault’s “What Is Critique?” where he does not negate phenomenology and analytic philosophy so much as just claim that he’s doing something else.
2. There were questions about how to navigate between Maeve Cooke’s work (on Amy Allen’s account) on radical contextualism (position #2) versus context-transcending theory (position #3) (138ff.). How does Cooke’s position in defense of #3 not collapse that view back into #3?
One view is that #3 inevitably collapses back into #2, and that this would be problematic except for the ability to orient #2 in terms of the temporal projection of norms. Norms are produced in context and, as norms, are inherently projectible (promisable) to other contexts which are relevant in the right respects. Metaphor not of posit and apply, but of production and reproduction.
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