Discussion of Foucault's The Courage of Truth, 1984 CdeF Lectures, Chs. 5-6
Questions and topics for discussion
- The difference between a modality of veridiction and a technique/ techne (p. 85); as relating to the self: “what is the significance of the modality of veridiction being part of the technology of the self?”
2) The relation between parrhesia, politics, and philosophy? (political as opposed to ethical parrhesia)
3) Mapping the four modes of veridiction ( p. 30)
4) The assertion that parrhesia is inoperative in a democracy.
5) How would one retain the force of the Socratic mission without God (p.85-86).
6) What's at stake in philosophy's founding on Socrates' death?
We began by mapping out the modes of veridiction (q. 3; see diagram image above). Contemporary forms of the modes are listed in parenthesis. It was noted that the most interesting aspect of this diagram was the connecting vectors, which represent composite modes, where we find parrhesia today.
We took up the discussion of contemporary manifestation of parrhesia and again interrogated Foucault's statement that this mode is lost in contemporary society. We listed possible contemporary examples, such as academic critiques of prejudices or Einstein's intervention in science. There were (at least) two divergent views of why these examples are problematic: 1) they show that parrhesia hasn't truly disappeared; 2) they are weak examples that don't suggest that parrhesia is something distinctive, worth recovering.
It was suggested that Socrates' truth-telling about the care of self cannot be replicated in contemporary society because we do not have a unified body politic and our public discourse is heavily mediated. Bradley Manning of the WikiLeaks controversy as a possible example of a contemporary parrhesiaste, but some differences are noted. Today, truth-telling would be related to one of the 3 other modes mentioned above. The notion of having the right kind of “soul” would probably mean having scientific training that allows for truth-telling in the technical mode.
We move on to q. 1 about the difference between a modality of veridiction and a technique.
It is proposed that a technique could be analyzed in terms of modes of veridiction. However, techne should not be reduced to technique. The former is something between art, technique, and technology...
Modes of veridiction are structural sets of conditions for being in the true or in the false (p. 14); for example, some try to undermine the OWS movement by claiming that their statements could not be either true or false because they don't fall within a recognizable mode of veridiction.
A related question: what are the conditions of possibility for parrhesia? On p.11-12 Foucault lists the defining characteristics, such as the willingness to risk breaking social bonds... However, these are not historical conditions—a set of epistemic political and ethical and practices that would make possible that kind of mode of veridiciton. Foucault does not seem to offer a full account of such conditions. He may be deliberately avoiding such a methodological move as he moves away from the type of study he carried out in The History of Sexuality v.1.
We turn to Foucault statement that “democracy is structurally unable to make room for parrhesia” (p.62 ), which seems to identify a historical structure in relation to parrhesia (q. 3). Is Foucault making a general claim about democracy, or is this historically specific to ancient Greece? The readings are mostly archeological descriptions of the texts that he is examining; he is probably not making a global claim, although this claim may be valid.
Why does democracy preclude certain forms of parrhesia but not others? Such as in the distinction between Socrates and Solon.
A meta- question about the reasons for reading this text. Parrhesia could be the opposite of the confessional mode; it is different on every point. Finding ways in which we can critique ourselves. Conception of self-critique under the sign of care rather than knowledge. This does not obey to the “know thyself” injunction; separating the self from the epistemic. “Know thyself” comes to dominate the domain of truth itself. There may be in fact an element of knowledge, of the epistemic, but the care takes precedence over knowledge.
We discussed at some length the problem of Foucault's ethnocentrism, which was raised in the previous session. If Foucault is searching for an alternative mode of truth-telling, why go to the Greeks when more recent non-Western sources are available? Could be defended by saying that Greek philosophy influenced modern French thought. There is a normative gesture implicit in Foucault's diagnostic study; however does not imply a normative response.
What level of normativity is implied? We agree that it is not an actionable normativity: not, “parrhesia is the answer.” Even though Foucault does not make claims about world history, his philosophical scope presupposes a universal subject. It may be that the pains which Foucault takes to historicize his research mitigate his ethnocentrism. His methodology could be taken for studies of non-Western cultures and his concepts do not preclude such studies. He is also a product of his time, and, at any rate, his ethnocentrism is a step forward compared to Heidegger.
The discussion of q. 2, regarding the relation between parrhesia, politics, and philosophy is opened with a broader question: does the concept of parrhesia imply that a philosopher play a public role? This is also linked to q. 6 about the significance of Foucault's statement that philosophy is founded on Socrates' death (90-91).
In antiquity philosophy would be located with parrhesia. Socrates' form of (philosophical, ethical?) parrhesia is different from Solon's political parrhesia. Solon's takes the form of orders on the city.
What is the object of parrhesia's critique, in particular in Socrates' case? The negative and positive content of Socrates' practice. The object of critique is mainly the self, or else others' care of self.
No comments:
Post a Comment