11.16.11, The Courage of Truth, Chs. 9 & 10

Nov. 16, The Courage of Truth, 1984 CdeF lectures, Chs. 9 & 10

Questions, discussion topics
-174, 179: Cynicism as a transhistorical category: what is a trans-historical category?
-Return to the question of ethnocentrism, e.g., Socrates; is he only arguing that Socratic practice is sufficient, though not necessary?
-161, 164-6: what's the relationship between metaphysics of the soul and the stylistics of existence?
-historical accuracy (pretty big claims)? too general? what difference does it make?
-165: what's the significance of noting that Cynical stylistics of existence takes place without doctrinal mediation?
-does he reduce the care of self to the aesthetics of existence? is this where care of self becomes self-styling?

Trans-historical Cynicism:
-'no universals' (from BofBio): presupposition; methodological supposition
-so here, he is supposing that there is the possibility of a trans-historical universal, viz., Cynicism
-there are other places where he uses similar language
-it's a mistake to confuse something trans-historical with a universal; here he is tracing a particular (something) in its continuity
-what's at stake for him in doing things this way?
-180: we cannot understand more contemporary forms of Cynicism without understanding its continuity; however, we cannot say they are exactly similar
-but carefully defining Cynicism allows us to see how he is really making a somewhat humble claim, i.e., that a particular practice has remained somewhat stable over time
-he is not asserting that Cynicism is universal; trans-historical does not imply universality; all it implies is some sort of continuity
-174: runs through the whole of western history; 178: from Antiquity to our present time
-it seems that the purpose of genealogical inquiry is to render history discontinuous; but it is also an empirical explanation of a particular continuity
-also, the second hour of the lecture is offered as an experiment
-once methodological constraints are established, then empirical claims can be made with respect to the object of the study
-he is interested in finding continuity in non-doctrinal form: practices that carry over; in this case, practices that are constitutive of a particular tradition, viz., the western tradition; practices are carried over and maintained (i.e., not offering a trans-historical ontology, but rather an account of how truth-telling has come to be associated with ontology)
-but this is different than Foucault's prior strategies: he is not doing something like overturning the 'repressive hypothesis,' he is attempting to define an aesthetics of existence
-narrowed in scope; still trans-historical, but not universal; situated methodologically as an attitude and way of being rather than a doctrine

-Cynicism as a stylistics of existence that is not deeply related to a metaphysics of the soul; this is not the same as there not being a theoretical framework
-what's an example of a practice that takes place without doctrinal mediation?: gender norms (one can give a fairly elaborate theoretical account, but one need not have a theory in order to practice gender norms)
-practices can be related to doctrine that is not necessarily tied to the doctrine (e.g., the changes within Christian religious practice)
-practices may be transmitted without reference to a body of doctrine
-what's interesting to Foucault in Cynicism is a certain kind of parrhesiatic insolence transmitted without a whole lot of doctrinal training
-what seems important is that we can analytically distinguish between one set of practices and another; in this case, we can see how, although a metaphysics of the soul was tightly wedded to a stylistics of existence in Socratic philosophy, this is not the case in Cynicism
-these are practices that have carried over without doctrinal mediation
-the problem then is how we would verify this continuity

-disappearance of parrhesia connected to the disappearance of destitution; can we connect this with the prevalance of capitalism? there are no 'scandalous manifestations of an unacceptable truth?' (186)
-destitution is not a necessary feature of Cynicism, e.g., artist
-they are less scandalous because they are parasitic on other modes of veridiction

-are these contemporary forms (in hour two, chap. 10) really not scandalous? are these parrhesiatic?
-modern art, for example, is only scandalous in a banal way; but we are not talking about contemporary art, which is perhaps just evidence of the how difficult it has become for art to retain the scandalous nature of modern art
-counterexample, Claire Fontaine (art collective): set of keys to galleries, map of U.S. made of matchsticks
-link to Cynicism in modern art (186)
-the scandal does happen: perhaps only to individuals or groups rather than to society as a whole
-a scandalization must be the manifestation of an unacceptable truth
-Occupy as an example of Cynical mode of life

-so what exactly makes something scandalous?: the mode of life (170-1); in the case of the artist, there must be some form of being that has a truth to it that manifests in a style of living that is scandalous, precisely because this manner of being is unacceptable, and this practice is transmitted with a minimal of theoretical development in its transmission

Nov. 9, The Courage of Truth, Chs. 5-6

Discussion of Foucault's The Courage of Truth, 1984 CdeF Lectures, Chs. 5-6

Questions and topics for discussion

1. The difference between a modality of veridiction and a technique/ techne (p. 85); as relating to the self: “what is the significance of the modality of veridiction being part of the technology of the self?”

2) The relation between parrhesia, politics, and philosophy? (political as opposed to ethical parrhesia)

3) Mapping the four modes of veridiction ( p. 30)

4) The assertion that parrhesia is inoperative in a democracy.

5) How would one retain the force of the Socratic mission without God (p.85-86).

6) What's at stake in philosophy's founding on Socrates' death?

We began by mapping out the modes of veridiction (q. 3; see diagram image above). Contemporary forms of the modes are listed in parenthesis. It was noted that the most interesting aspect of this diagram was the connecting vectors, which represent composite modes, where we find parrhesia today.

We took up the discussion of contemporary manifestation of parrhesia and again interrogated Foucault's statement that this mode is lost in contemporary society. We listed possible contemporary examples, such as academic critiques of prejudices or Einstein's intervention in science. There were (at least) two divergent views of why these examples are problematic: 1) they show that parrhesia hasn't truly disappeared; 2) they are weak examples that don't suggest that parrhesia is something distinctive, worth recovering.

It was suggested that Socrates' truth-telling about the care of self cannot be replicated in contemporary society because we do not have a unified body politic and our public discourse is heavily mediated. Bradley Manning of the WikiLeaks controversy as a possible example of a contemporary parrhesiaste, but some differences are noted. Today, truth-telling would be related to one of the 3 other modes mentioned above. The notion of having the right kind of “soul” would probably mean having scientific training that allows for truth-telling in the technical mode.

We move on to q. 1 about the difference between a modality of veridiction and a technique.

It is proposed that a technique could be analyzed in terms of modes of veridiction. However, techne should not be reduced to technique. The former is something between art, technique, and technology...

Modes of veridiction are structural sets of conditions for being in the true or in the false (p. 14); for example, some try to undermine the OWS movement by claiming that their statements could not be either true or false because they don't fall within a recognizable mode of veridiction.

A related question: what are the conditions of possibility for parrhesia? On p.11-12 Foucault lists the defining characteristics, such as the willingness to risk breaking social bonds... However, these are not historical conditions—a set of epistemic political and ethical and practices that would make possible that kind of mode of veridiciton. Foucault does not seem to offer a full account of such conditions. He may be deliberately avoiding such a methodological move as he moves away from the type of study he carried out in The History of Sexuality v.1.

We turn to Foucault statement that “democracy is structurally unable to make room for parrhesia” (p.62 ), which seems to identify a historical structure in relation to parrhesia (q. 3). Is Foucault making a general claim about democracy, or is this historically specific to ancient Greece? The readings are mostly archeological descriptions of the texts that he is examining; he is probably not making a global claim, although this claim may be valid.

Why does democracy preclude certain forms of parrhesia but not others? Such as in the distinction between Socrates and Solon.

A meta- question about the reasons for reading this text. Parrhesia could be the opposite of the confessional mode; it is different on every point. Finding ways in which we can critique ourselves. Conception of self-critique under the sign of care rather than knowledge. This does not obey to the “know thyself” injunction; separating the self from the epistemic. “Know thyself” comes to dominate the domain of truth itself. There may be in fact an element of knowledge, of the epistemic, but the care takes precedence over knowledge.

We discussed at some length the problem of Foucault's ethnocentrism, which was raised in the previous session. If Foucault is searching for an alternative mode of truth-telling, why go to the Greeks when more recent non-Western sources are available? Could be defended by saying that Greek philosophy influenced modern French thought. There is a normative gesture implicit in Foucault's diagnostic study; however does not imply a normative response.

What level of normativity is implied? We agree that it is not an actionable normativity: not, “parrhesia is the answer.” Even though Foucault does not make claims about world history, his philosophical scope presupposes a universal subject. It may be that the pains which Foucault takes to historicize his research mitigate his ethnocentrism. His methodology could be taken for studies of non-Western cultures and his concepts do not preclude such studies. He is also a product of his time, and, at any rate, his ethnocentrism is a step forward compared to Heidegger.

The discussion of q. 2, regarding the relation between parrhesia, politics, and philosophy is opened with a broader question: does the concept of parrhesia imply that a philosopher play a public role? This is also linked to q. 6 about the significance of Foucault's statement that philosophy is founded on Socrates' death (90-91).

In antiquity philosophy would be located with parrhesia. Socrates' form of (philosophical, ethical?) parrhesia is different from Solon's political parrhesia. Solon's takes the form of orders on the city.

What is the object of parrhesia's critique, in particular in Socrates' case? The negative and positive content of Socrates' practice. The object of critique is mainly the self, or else others' care of self.

Notes from 11/2/11, The Courage of the Truth, 1 February 1984 lecture

CGC Meeting November 2, 2011

Discussion of the first lecture, 1 Feb 1984, of Foucault's The Courage of the Truth

Questions

Distinction on page 3 between epistemic structures and alethurgic forms? Does Foucault think these are separable in practice or is the distinction for analytic purposes?

On pp 25-26, F goes through four things – not historically distinct social types – rather modes of veridiction – what are these? Are these not social types? What is at stake? What kind of analytic grid and what are its possible objects of analysis?

If parrhesia is somewhere where authenticity is catalyzed by risk – how is this connected to veridicality or truth as adequation? To what extent is what is happening there necessarily connected to a notion of truth that puts words and reality into some kind of relation to that equation?

What does it mean for the parrhesiatic modality to have disappeared as such (30)?

On page 24 – teaching is not included in parrhesia – does it not take courage to teach? What does it mean to make this claim, could we do the analysis in Foucault’s terms today and reach the same conclusion? 

Distinction between modality and technique?

P 28 – ethnocentrism?

Difficulty of analyzing the historical-empirical content – can we instead draw a square of four modes of veridiction and try to find more recent examples, work with the concepts? Combination of prophetic and ontological e.g.? MAP!

Discussion

Question about alethurgic – making speech acts as experts or non-experts? Are alethurgic claims similar to expert speech acts?

-         Through these fearless acts the subject constitutes himself as the subject of a discourse of truth. Considers himself a certain type of subject through doing this.

-         Which subjectivity is constituted? Whose? By whom? Both speaker and listener have subjectivity constitutued.

-         P. 9 summary – triple shift – relation

-         Epistemology is something about relations between truth claims, knowledge claims, economies of truth; alethurgic involves relation between forms of truth and forms of subjectivity and its emergence. Non-expert speech a better paradigm? Truth is coming into being and this is tied to emergence of subjectivity?

-         F not making an ontological truth claim – this is a way of analyzing a phenomenon of parrhesia?

Is glen beck/sean hannidy a parrhesiast?

Parrhesia is more than authenticity plus sincerity plus risk.

Reflections on alethurgy – definition given – appositive – production and manifestation. Are these in conflict? Disclosure is a production.

-         His analysis of rhetoric in antiquity is a misrepresentation in some ways.

-         Does this issue of accuracy matter?

-         Why is production vs. manifestation an issue?

-         Rhetoric as an art of producing convictions (13) vs parrhesia as production of truth. Speech that works to produce effect in audience vs speech that works to produce truth of one’s self?

-         Rhetoric is a technique and not a mode of veridiction.

Modes of veridiction

Ways of truth-telling and being recognized as a truth-teller.

Why is parrhesia a special mode of veridiction? Perhaps because of the relation, of the two people being involved in an important interactive and intersubjective way. Potentially breaking a relationship, so there must be one

Maybe F is interested in this because it could be a forgotten resource, it has disappeared as such in modernity (30). Has to be intersection with other modes.

If epistemological analysis is about what is taken as true (analytic – is it true? Other  - what is taken as true?), Alethurgic – how is it produced?

Difference between ‘what’ and ‘how’ of truth.

Recasts his former work as analysis of modes of production of truth – its how-ness not its what-ness.

Truth-telling. What is significant about telling?

We may not be receptive to truth-telling in the parrhesiatic modality. Are people who act parrhestiatically taken seriously by intellectuals?

Parrhesia requires 3 things (11):

-         Bond between truth and belief of speaker

-         Challenge to bond between interlocutors and it requires courage to challenge the bond

-         Person puts his life at risk

Do these requirements line of up the three on page 8? Does this map on?

Develops in context of care-for-the-self, and later gets reorganized around the axis of knowing-for-one’s-self. A pre-history of confession. But also note that medieval Christianity is an important step or link – because in antiquity parrhesia is intermeshed with wisdom, and in mideval wisdom is linked with techne – courage gets replaced by obedience in the confession (8-29, historical narrative).

Where there is obedience, there is no parrhesia – says at the end of the book.

Modes of veridiction: truth-telling as an acting in a way, a stance, in parrhesia it is a courageous way of acting akin to virtue. But the other three other modes seems to have more stability. Uses roles as examples of the modes.

NOT ROLES or social characters! Transhistorical phenomenon? – essentially modes of veridiction – 26. What are roles? Why are they not roles? This is an analytic framework.

Analytic – concept of mode of veridiction

Object – 4 modes of veridiction

Cannot be roles because they are aspects of roles. And also because they are occasional – do not define a subject exhaustively.

When you find the modality now it is interpenetrated with other modalities.

Character traits? Courage – in action or in character/person?

How do we make sense of the disappearance of this mode?

Is it no longer possible to recognize ourselves as acting in this mode of veridiction?

Something is at stake for critical philosophers if critique is an activity dependent on these other activities and targets – ontology, prophecy, and technics.

Self-affirmative rather than self-denunciative?  This potential for subjectivity isn’t available as such?

Do we agree with the claim that it has disappeared as such?

-         Martin Luther King?

-         Rush Limbaugh?

-         Hitler?

-         Crazy person? Probably not. Possibly lacks necessary requirement of community.

-         Diogenes – there was a space back then. Now, because this isn’t a recognized modality of truth-telling, these people are seen as crazy.

How do media institutions work and intersect in forming a context that may or may not have to do with the intelligibility and possibility of parrhesia?

Roles as recognizable vehicles for modes of acting?

What is the truth-value in a parrhesiatic act? Not parasitic on common beliefs?

Criteria on page 16. The parrhesiast helps in blindness and leaves a moral task.

Do our institutions not let us have these acts be successful anymore?

Spirituality allows parrhesia. Foucault also gives the example of spiritual advisor. Prophet, overlap?

Interlocutor has to be willing to play the game. Can we put pressure on the reception? Is success in Austinian terms epistemology? Possibility of success – veridiction; successful or not – epistemological. Can’t only be production because the possibility of felicity must be there.

Does this not exist for the academy or in intellectuals?

Public vs. private. Is political speech necessarily co-opted? Has the parrhesiatic form of truth-telling become rarified? Privatized?

Families and friends? Gadamerian conversation or He’s Just Not That Into You. P. 6 of the text – a friend.  

Modes of veridiction depend on conditions of possibility.