Thursday, January 15, 2026

Arendt, The Human Condition, Ch. 2 and 3

1. What is Arendt's distinction between private property and wealth?

2. How is Arendt understanding "privacy/privative"? 

3. How does Marx's distinction between productive and unproductive labor map on to Arendt's account of labor? Also, what is "labor-power" for Arendt? (pp. 87-89).

4. What kind of continuity or discontinuity do we get with Arendt's account of modernity? (e.g., the secularization of political concepts) (p. 64).

5. Dissolution of private space --> depth/hiddenness that is lost? What is the "darkness"? Is it normative? How do we square this with her method? (p. 71).

Private property not in the economic sense, but something more like "a space of one's own." Where one protects oneself from others. That's why Arendt is reluctant about the abolition of private property and maybe wants to disassociate the abolition of wealth (inequality?) with the abolition of private property (contra Marx?). 

Why does Arendt equivocate private property with hiddenness? In other words, why "hidden" and not something like "unavailable" or "un-regardable"? In the public realm, you're in this space of constant accountability; the private sphere is the way to hide away from that -- something which the public cannot penetrate. e.g., even slaves were not without property (pp. 61-62).

Private property was also tied to place, and place was identified with family (p. 61). Also tied to citizenship, if you were relinquished of your property then you'd be relinquished of your citizenship. Slaves still held "personal or private possessions" even if they did not private property in the sense of a place of their own. The working class is the craftsmen; the laboring class was the slave.

The point is that modernity/Marxism conflates property and wealth. There's also sacredness associated with private property, wealth was never concerned sacred in antiquity. It was considered bad to entirely expend one's private property in pursuit of wealth because you're giving up political freedom. Private property as the means of political freedom; making slaves do the labor for you.

Have y'all read Benjamin Constant's essay on the distinction between ancient liberty and modern liberty? For the ancients, freedom is the ability to act and speak in public; for the modern, liberty is the right to do what I want in their privacy.

Hiddenness in the sense of retreat vs. hiddenness in the sense of hidden-away (e.g., slaves and women). Slaves and women as living "laborious life," laborious because devoted to bodily functions (e.g., production and reproduction) (pp. 72-73).

For example, people nowadays talk about their domicile/homes as an investment, rather than as a place of existential significance (where one dwells and lives one life). 

Marx, Smith, Locke (e.g.,) are unable to make a distinction between property and wealth; private property as the basis of wealth accumulation, rather than as a place of hiddenness. 

Arendt's idiosyncratic vocabulary can make it hard to track her critiques of other authors (e.g., Locke, Smith, Marx) who don't use those concepts in the same way(?).

Tuesday, January 13, 2026

Wtr Term Readings: Arendt's 'The Human Condition'

We will focus on Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition this term -- we will read selections from this book during weeks 1 through 6 and then in weeks 7 through 9 we will focus on comparing Arendt's and Foucault's historical methods.

Week 1

Ch. I (Introduction)

§1 = 11 pages

Ch. II (Public and Private)
§§ 4-6 = 28 pages

Week 2

Ch. II (Public and Private)

§§ 8-10 = 21 pages

 +

Ch. III (Labor)

§11 = 14 pages

Week 3

No Meeting

 

Week 4

Ch. III (Labor)

§§ 13, 14, 17 = 23 new pages

Week 5

Ch. IV (Work)

§§ 18, 20, 21, 22 = 28 pages

Week 6

Ch. V (Action)

§§ 24, 25, 29, 30 = 26 page

Week 7

Ch. V (Action)

§§ 31, 32 = 16 pages

 +

Ch. VI (Modern Age)

§§ 35, 36 = 20 pages

Week 8

Ch. VI (Modern Age)

§§42-45 = 32 pages

Week 9

Arendt, essay on history and method from Between Past and Future tbd

Foucault, essay on history and method tbd

Week 10

Tentative 

Essay on Foucault and Arendt by tbd

(See also this recent special issue of Journal of Philosophy of Historyhttps://brill.com/view/journals/jph/18/3/jph.18.issue-3.xml?srsltid=AfmBOooK18torb3hvUVfY0A4g9IlPr53_MBAvdgWtJ9vfQLrTYNz2icv)

Week Exam

Tentative

 

 

 

Wednesday, December 3, 2025

The Birth of Biopolitics, 14 March lecture

 Questions:

  1. If this is a genealogy, what kind of genealogy is it? Should we consider it as such?
  2. Question of neoliberalism about scarce resources and allocation of them. What is the relationship between this allocation and strategic programming? (P. 223, 227)
  3. Criticism against theory of imperialism; how much is MF concerned with Schumpeter’s criticism of Marxist/Luxemburgian theory of imperialism? (P.231-232)
  4. When MF discusses theory of human capital—move from labor to time, what is the role of temporality in MF conception of human capital?
  5. MF offers a historiography of neoliberalism; how do we reconcile this with genealogy? (P.216–219)
  6. Why does he choose these three events specifically; one could argue there’s a lot more events he could have chosen, what was the significance of these?
  7. “Let’s methodologically suppose universals don’t exist…” (P.3) The contrast between “dialectical logic” and “strategic logic”…”I suggest replacing dialectic logic with strategic logic…” Is this cool? (p.42) 
Discussion:

Q 1: By ‘it’ being a genealogy..what do we mean?
It has a genealogical impetus but it is trying to track the present so it doesn’t have the same ability (Like D&P, for example) to examine an established archive. We don’t have the privilege of looking back on what is now obvious to us. MF sees this as a policy project but it is early to assess the nuance of techniques. Interesting that there is a lot of debates re why it is the “Birth of Biopolitics”? There is a foresight—maybe an anticipatory genealogy? 
Is this where he is articulating his notion of biopolitics? What do we mean by it? The neoliberalist subject? 
Post-war, Chicago school neoliberalism are main objects of critique. Is there a clear method or are these just observations? 
 Would Birth of Neoliberalism be a more accurate title? History of Sexuality where he works through concept of biopolitics/biopower. 
He’s tracking a mode of thought, a mode of analysis…looking at how a specific form of subjectivity is made. 
Maybe this is more of an archaeological analysis than genealogical?
Elements of policy, there’s a practice related to this discourse…a way of being. 
Now we can track this because we are in the future of this present (could have not happened).

Not just empirical examples; MF as trying to create a system for these examples? P. 228 on taking a spouse with equal levels of human capital…P. 225 “principle of decipherment…” “problematic of needs…” There’s a sense in which he has these methodological terms that does sound more like an archaeology. The problematization more like genealogy; trying to constitute the thought undergirding the examples he uses.
Not starting with a universal but how a universal is being built. (Q 7)
We could look at a universal in neoliberalism and perform a genealogy on how it was built. 
(P.223) “Adopts the task of analyzing a form of human behavior…”
Maybe this speak to Tiisala’s argument re an underlying savior? It’s not only about rationality in a science but rationality in a human behavior.
MF as citing theorists; this is pre-Reagan, pre-Thatcher…Sounds like a description of a “political rationality.” This is quintessential archaeology; the rationality isn’t an exercise of power. It’s another thing to have this in play, in policies. It’s not that there is no genealogy here but it’s not above and beyond History of Madness a Birth of the Clinic.
(P.232) “…programming of the processes I am talking about…” he sees the emergence of a kind of power here but you cannot get the full story. It’s archaeological but it’s more about where he’s standing in regards to this method. 
Maybe MF is just developing a neoliberal theory of governmentality? Do all MF’s works have to be conscious of methodology?
Does seem there is something he is trying to track. 
What is the difference between an archaeology and a traditional theory here?
These lectures approach interesting theoretical approaches to neoliberalism.
Even at the level of research, you don’t start with a method but observations…
MF also begins stating interest in government and art of government; liberalism as a government; the conduct of conduct. There is a continuity thematically with other things he’s doing as well. 
The methodology question is important with MF because his work is so empirical. It seems like there is an onus on the research or the work to not be done in a pell-mell manner whereas speculative philosophy can get away with this more. We can then track that methodology in some extent. If we assume he is more or less applying a methodology, what in the method more or less causes him to deduce this theory of neoliberalism as opposed to others?
One question: how much is the method dependent on the historical dependence? If the neoliberal policy prescriptions haven’t been implemented, how can you give an adequate genealogical account of their power? 
Distinction between recent past and near future: MF always discussing about recent past, describing something up until a few decades ago. 
Rabinow and distinction between historiography for the past and anthropology for the contemporary investigation.
(P.33) “I don’t think we can find the cause….we should establish the intelligibility of this process…” Maybe one difference—one event as the cause for something, there’s still a focus on the event but there’s multiple and its not over-rationalizing the significance of the event?
Marxist critiques flatten the plurality of neoliberalism (it exists different in different political economies).
Regardless of it is a genealogy, how does genealogy figure into these broader historical events he is discussing? 
Genealogy operates through multiple historical concatenations. 
Role of the individual; we think of things like policy changes in terms of individuals; dangers of thinking of this in terms of ‘one event.’ Economic historian might point to one cause of an event, how does genealogy respond? History places a lot of emphasis on subjects as the movers of events rather than events themselves.

Interesting look at the family and the ways the private is folded into economics in ways others don’t notice, new to this period, not addressed by traditional Marxist analysis. 
Discussion of migration as an investment in life; similarities to the way people discuss migrants today. 
What did he have in mind in this section? (P.230)
“Migration has a cost…” Cost for the migrant, nation? Cost for who?
“What is the function of this cost…” 
(Q 4) He contrasts economic subject qua labor power; (p 220) comment about Marx and the worker as just a worker; in neoliberal, worker is not a worker in social time it is an entrepreneur who invests in the future. 
This is not about exploiting the worker til its death; you have to invest and replenish; it’s not capital against life but capital and life; a traditional Marxist view not sufficient for analysis. 
Different kind of work; it’s not just abstract labor for a job but involves a level of self-investment as a worker. We can see this in people’s responses the things like why we go to college; not many would answer they go for the intrinsic value of wanting to know. 
Time and temporality…(p 221) “neoliberals and marxists…[on] variables of time” How actually is time the key variable for neoliberals? How does this connect to Punitive Society lectures? 
In the old capitalist model: time as purely abstract; in neoliberalism time: time reconstituted and matters, it’s about the individual’s future; time as something you plan.
(P 223) “Analysis of internal rationality…” there’s something intentional happening when you look at economics through the lens of behavior. 
Key concept of neoliberalism MF draws on: choice. Choice is a phenomenon that governs economic behavior. Everyone is an entrepreneur capable of making good market choices on their own. Good economics cultivates good choices. It’s an economic theory that does away with broad economic theories. (P 222)
(P 226) “…Man of consumption, insofar as he consumes, is a producer…” This has a hold on how we both experience and use our time. 
Fundamental shift from classical factory model (worker sells labor and that’s it) to labor as a function of classical accumulation which is itself a temporal motion? 




Wednesday, November 26, 2025

Discipline and Punish, "Illegalities and delinquency" (pt. 4, ch 2)

 Questions

1. Is there anyone to whom surveillance does not apply (200; 204)?

2. How is "work" operating in this chapter (and in The Punitive Society)? What is the relation between disciplinary power and work?

3. Production of delinquency appears as a demobilizing tactic, but how does his class analysis figure into Foucault's methodology with respect to discipline? 

4. The delinquent is produced "as a pathologized subject" (277). How does said production connect with the "usefulness" of delinquency in the relation to work-labor?

5. How does genealogy determine what is "a target" (276)? In this case it appears to be illegalities or illegalisms. 

6. How do we understand illegalities through the failure of penality (272)? Does this help us define illegalities/illegalisms?

7. Foucault anti-dialectical form of argument: prison and reform (264-265). Who are his interlocutors here? Or is this an argument geared at dialectics more broadly?

8. If the function of the prison is not to render docile those who transgress the law, how do we square this with the "opening illegalities" which function towards rendering docile (272; 277)?

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Discussion

Description of delinquency in relation to labor, labor organizing, and labor rights (and its relation to the formation of social class) was very interesting as forms of resistance or counter-conduct (274ff). This had not been developed before as clearly. 

Illegalities are targeted by disciplinary power and the constitutive failures produce delinquency in a way that favors or is useful to the bourgeoisie. In that sense, it is not only the production of workers but also the disruption of dissidence or sedition that is crucial for class (or capitalist) power. (see, e.g., 280). In that sense, the emergence of the delinquent is parallel to that of the worker.

Another important relation of delinquency with labor can be found in Foucault's analysis of the paralegal development of police to manage "the mass of reserve labor" (280). But the delinquent is also useful as a political weapon.

What is difference of this genealogy from a Marxist account of class formation? It could be seen as a response of why certain revolutionary attempts failed (the internalization of discipline). Different emphasis of the emergence of the working class and the reserve army but in terms of the productivity of power.

Diffusion of illegalities (273-275): the association of crime/criminality and class is something novel (the "classization" of crime) that Foucault is attempting to track. There is a production of class disymmetry as a vector through which penal discourse and practices travel. 

There is an introduction of the present in the text that brings into view the contemporaneity of the archive and Foucault's genealogy (268): the uprisings in French prisons are articulated as a "reform" and therefore as an "improvement" or "amelioration" of the prison that is thus unable to recognize its functional and historical specificity.

Notion of tactics as "reach[ing] their target" (285). This sounds intentional. How do we square this with Foucault's emphasis on power a non-intentional? Why is there such a "need"? Is it a need to solve a problem that arise in conflict/class/revolutionary struggles?

Tactics are bound up with articulations of a problem – The coming into power of a class is contingent upon it being able to articulate a "class dissymmetry" (276) successfully and functionally. 

Part of the argument could be that the moralization of the lumpenproletariat is a fuller story of this form of subjectivity. (the lumpenproletariat). Delinquency is nonetheless the vector for class differentiation. If you tell the story that way, you can tell a different story about the emergence and hegemony of the capitalist class that does not assume that they had power in advance.

Interesting that he refers to indiscipline in terms of a "native, immediate liberty" (292) when addressing the Fourierists.


Wednesday, November 19, 2025

The Punitive Society, March 28 Lecture

 1. Foucault's use of habit to describe disciplinary power? How do we understand its critical use?

2. What is the relationship between genealogy and habit? Particularly, the "change" of habit. 

3. Fleshing out distinctions between ideology and "strategies of power"? 

4. Can we track the four theoretical schemas of power? (pp. 228 - 229, 231, 233).

5. What is an "institution" for Foucault? How does this differ from something like "apparatus"? (p. 235).


Institution as social form? "... institutional condition of possibility..." (227). Institutions as "effects" of techniques, practices, knowledges -- Foucault's "nominalism." Institutions as something like "anticipatory dispositifs"?

Example:

power-knowledge ---> surveillance, examination, normalization ---> techniques(?) ---> institutions (e.g., prison, clinic, army, etc.).


Four schemas of power:

(1) power as exercised as opposed to appropriative (i.e., not a matter of possession) 

(2) power as diffused as opposed to localized (centralized?)

(3) power as constitutive of production, not subordinate to it 

(4) power as knowledge formation, not ideological (i.e., power-knowledge)

Who is Foucault mogging? Arguably, political philosophy hitherto.

(1) Hobbes and the social contract tradition.

(2) Althusser 

(3) "post-Hegelians," i.e. (early) Marx

(4) Critical theory, i.e., Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse (and Althusser, again). 

In terms of ideology, what is meant by "transparency" and "opacity." Against the idea that ideology distorts actual knowledge, whereas Foucault wants to suggest that we need not posit hidden motives and interests to understand the operations of power. Ideology critique as revealing how operations of power distort consciousness of subjects (false consciousness).

Foucault distinction between eighteenth-century and nineteenth-cenutury discourses. What's the exact nature of the shift? Foucault doesn't seem to be offering a comprehensive theory of habit -- wish he was saying more here.


Wednesday, November 12, 2025

Foucault: March 21, 1973 Lecture (Punitive Society)


The group began with questions: 

(1) p. 206: Is Foucault making a distinction between relays/multiples of power as opposed to productive power/powers that serve a specific function?
(2) p. 212: What is the second "function" of sequestration that Foucault mentions?
(3) p. 214: Double system of prevention of heterosexuality and prohibition of homosexuality?  
(4) p. 206-207: What is meant by hyper-power?

Discussion...

On Hyper-power: 
—Intensification of power on bodies
—Does hyper-power mean more power?
—Social bodies: power is predicated on membership; mechanical bodies: on productive function; dynastic: ?

—Is the prison the site of hyper-power? Site of multiplication (places where mechanisms of power, normalization, the examination, occur and then become diffuse through the social body). 

—State structure is a relay-multiplier of power "within a society in which the State structure remains the conditions for the functioning of these institutions" (209)?

On "Mono-functional institutions" (p. 212):

—Institutions appear to be mono-functional, but that is not the case. 
—Second function is to fabricate the social—"fabricate something that is both prohibition and norm, and that has to become reality: they are institutions of normalization" (214-215). 
—At first sight not implied in the institutional function itself 
—Establishes whole set of norms that exceed institution's stated/explicit functions. 

—Function in Foucault vs. Althusser/Marx

Prevention of heterosexuality vs. prohibition of homosexuality (p. 213-214): 

—Structure of a sex-segregated school system means that heterosexuality as a practice is prevented (cannot be exercised); it just is prevented but not on some moral ground; just a structural feature. 
—Homosexuality needs to be prohibited 
—Heterosexuality is the external norm that is diffused; homosexuality is internal 

—p. 214: is apparatus in footnote apparatus or dispositif  in French translation. 

New type of discursivity (p. 215) 

Wednesday, November 5, 2025

Michel Foucault - The Punitive Society, Lecture 10 (7 March 1973)

Questions:

1. (p. 178) Criminology and medico-juducial codification - what is the relation? What is transcription? 

2. (p. 175) Fascism as connecting military force and corporatism to protect apparatus of production. How does this relate to capitalist penality?

3. (p. 173) How is 'illegalism' different from 'infra-legal illegalism'? What marks the distinction between them? 

4. (p. 171) How does the earlier fear of the vagabond connect to urbanization? Is this the 'whole floating population turned out by poverty'? 

5. (p. 175) How is the 'record book (livret)' connected to militarism and corporatism?

6. (p. 174) How is the civil code connected to habit? Is there a temporal dimension here? 


Discussion

* Reference to the "text" and "discourse." We are not getting "behind" or "underneath" what is said. (p. 165)

  • It seems like the concern is not the vagabond but the proximity of workers and how their habits are connected to profitability (Q4)
    • Vagabond is the paradigmatic figure of delinquency - but now all of these other modes of punitive practices that are extended to workers
    • Now, there is increase in state apparatus and production 
    • The workers are quasi-delinquent; Foucault wants to show the connection between work and punishment
    • Narrative is about the mechanism of control towards non-working populations moving to the worker as the central site of concern
  • Immorality, concerning "the body, need, desire, habit, and will" (p. 176); "whole system of moral conditioning needs to be incorporated into penality" (p. 176)
  • Vagabond in 1714 (p. 45) versus workers in 1830 (p. 172) (Q4)
    • Technique - penitentiary applied to vagabond; then penality extends to worker
  • Social enemy as a figure is transcribed into "immature, maladjusted, and primitive" (Q1)
    • "moralizing modulation" (p. 177)
    • Shift to morality of worker over the contract (p. 174) 
    • Quakers not medico-judicial in their penitentiary 
      • No psychologists in prison
    • Beccaria isn't connecting the medical to punishment 
      • Medicalization and moralization that are different
      • Moralization now outside of prison 
    • (p. 91) medical health and religious transformation
  • Discipline or the crafting of habits (moralization) 
  • Discipline and Punish - sovereign form of punishment versus reformers (Beccaria) versus disciplinary 
    • So, Beccaria is not disciplinary
    • These are all in the discourse; practices are also part of what is said (Foucault is not giving conspiratorial social theory) 
  • (p. 179) "penal text" procedures of moralization
  • Different functions of juridico-medical versus criminology (Q1)
    • Criminology gives punishment to crime
    • Medico-judicial gives the prediction of criminal 
    • "homicidal monomania" creates a medical cause (p. 179) 
    • Criminology transports medico-judicial model elsewhere
  • Penal Code 
    • We could think of a practicing judge who says "I'm not a psychologist" and "social dangerousness is not an infraction in the code" 
    • Psychologist gives the law a way to identify social dangerousness - language of "dispositions"
  • Branching out of a disciplinary society - not just people who commit crimes, but those who could potentially commit crimes (also extends beyond the domain of the courts)
  • infra-legal illegalism - think of "infra" as "not quite" or "underneath" (Q3)
    • But weren't the illegalisms already infra? 
    • Examples of "infra-legal": lazy, getting drunk, being late
    • "infra-legal" illegalism is not opposed to illegalism (?) 
      • Disagreement on this point - weren't the earlier cases of illegalism cases which were illegal but not punished?
    • Illegalisms that officially break the law versus those that don't 

Note: Recommendation to read 14 March, 194-196, for the next week + 21 March