This term we will meet Fridays at 2:00pm for workshops on group members' (and a few visitors) work. Below is a draft schedule -- nothing is set in stone yet.
Week 1 - April 4 - Nick chapter on Foucault and mass culture (confirmed)
Week 2 - April 11 - Larry paper on the genetic fallacy (confirmed)
Week 3 - April 18 - no meeting
Week 4 - April 25 - Fulden paper on genealogy, phenomenology, and the body (confirmed)
Week 5 - May 2 - ?TBD
Week 6 - May 9 - no meeting (members out of town)
Week 7 - May 16 - Dr. Verena Erlenbusch, University of Memphis (joining via video/skype), ms. paper on terrorism (confirmed)
Week 8 - May 23 - Colin draft paper on CdF lectures and GIP writings from 1971
Week 9 - May 30 - Final quick wrap-up meeting, plans for next year
Tuesday, March 25, 2014
Sunday, March 2, 2014
Oedipal Knowledge
Questions:
1.
Why
does every philosopher read Antigone/Oedipus and nothing else? Sophocles was
not the only playwright in Ancient Greece.
2.
Why
Oedipus? What does Oedipus do for Foucault? What does it get him in terms of
the arguments he’s been making in the other lectures? Is he giving an
“interpretation”? And if not, what is he doing?
3.
Would
this be considered a genealogical account? Tracing a moment at which
power/knowledge was attempted to be separated from one another – talking about
transition (not just archeological snapshot). But it’s also lacking some
features of genealogy: looking at this very foundational text, which he gets
away from later. Is this a genealogy or if not what is it?
4.
Pg
249 the tyrant and the seer vs. Pg 189 tyrant, the sage, popular power : Why
does popular power drop out, does it drop out? 3 great procedures: do these map
onto the tyrant, the sage, popular power?
5.
Power/knowledge
6.
What’s
the role of excess and transgression here (256-7)?
Discussion:
Why not engage anyone other than Sophocles
who can refute the picture Sophocles gives? Foucault analyzes few scattered
remnants of texts from Ancient Greece and from that deduces, this is how it was
in Ancient Greece. It seems completely fallacious.
Oedipus has been read wrong. He is a
figure that embodies two competing claims to knowledge, a figure of excess and
transgression. Here is this thing that has been read in one way, and here is
another way to read it. So is this an interpretation?
This could be read in an English
class. But it could also be used as a tool for
genealogy. It is the only literary text he deals with. Except Homer:
historical position on Homer – how truth claims were made in Greek society
(pushes literary elements aside). Whereas this lecture engages the literary aspects
of the play very deeply.
This is a great reading of Oedipus
but we are desensitized to it because we are so focused on power/knowledge.
What is he getting out of it, other
than convenience? If you’re a Continental philosopher, you have to write on
Bartleby, even though it’s not even central to Melville’s corpus.
He doesn’t look at Homer, but all
these obscure texts. He draws on all the stuff that you have to go to archives
to get it. Maybe it’s an interpretation here, or maybe something that’s not an
interpretation. But maybe then he realized you can’t do that with texts like
Oedipus.
But how do you approach a work of
art? It’s a piece of fiction, an artwork. Can we draw anything conclusive from
it? And if you can’t, it seems like it’s never not an interpretation. This text
as a product of its moment – he doesn’t analyze that. Is it symptomatic of
these things in Greek society? But he doesn’t do that – something happens in
society and here is its representation in literature. Oedipus as representing
societal change?
Agamben: Foucault’s method is
paradigmatic. He finds a paradigm for this broader social assembly. For
example: Bentham’s sketches of the panopticon. Maybe Oedipus was paradigmatic.
What, then, is the tragedy
paradigmatic of?
Gnome – Oedipus’ self-asserting
knowledge: master of his own destiny (dikezein?)
Akouein – Knowledge that listens to
and obeys some outside force (which Oedipus refuses to do).
The tyrant and the seer – 2 kinds of knowledge
meet in his body and his expulsion, his banishment is structurally necessary
for Greek society.
Pg 255: “Wanting to see for himself,
he has seen himself…” blocks his ears and blinded. He is the object of his own
transgression and punishment is carried out on his self, his own body. But he
is a figure of transgressive knowledge.
What is this transgression? Apart
from sleeping with his mother. Pushing the divine law out of the city,
replacing it with juridical law, taking the place of the Gods. He wants
disinterested knowledge but as the sovereign he cannot be seeking knowledge on
this new model and not exercising power at the same time. His action of trying
to know himself comes into conflict with his power.
Knowledge by witness – knowledge by
facts: ends up corresponding to the oracular – the knowledge of the Gods.
This particular kind of knowledge is
dangerous. The danger of knowledge. Knowledge
becomes dangerous when you attempt to control it. Everything about Oedipus is
too much. Banishment – social form of blindness. Blinding himself – double blindness:
can’t see so can’t be seen. It’s not about trying to get into Oedipus’ head
(not psychological) but looking at all these external elements. Incest taboo is
also pushed to the side.
Along with Oedipus disinterested
knowledge is banished. What is enforced is the order of the Gods. Where does
the purely disinterested knowledge come back in? Creon represents the law.
Antigone is speaking to the Gods and trying to mobilize that power against
Creon. But Antigone gets killed, though Creon does not win (Gods have the last
say), his wife and son commit suicide. The law of the Gods gets reinstantiated.
Antigone prevails in enforcing the law of the Gods.
Sphinx – warner for trying to know
who you are. Oedipus ignores the warning. He’s definitely transgressing. He’s
trying to have the knowledge of Gods without actually listening to them. As a
tyrant there is also an excess of power. He’s excessive and trangressive
because he represents knowledge as his own power and not knowledge of order of
things/disinterested knowledge. Power to order the world. Knowledge of the
order of the world given by the Gods, the seer – disinterested knowledge. Oedipus
is mimicking Gods here in pretending that his knowledge is disinterested.
Oedipus is too good at it – he does
know, he figures it out. He’s so committed to figuring it out. It’s not
ignorance and guilt, it’s not unconsciousness and desire. He’s not operating
with a lack, he’s operating with a too muchness. Excess and transgression:
fully Deleuzian. The three syntheses of time – third synthesis: the hero is
destroyed because he’s overcome by this task as he overcomes it (a paradox).
Is it too much because it’s so
self-interested and so not disinterested? Figuring out he’s the object of the
search and subject of it too. That’s what we’re not supposed to be in the later
figuration of disinterested knowledge: knowledge is knowledge of something out
there in the world, but here he’s propelling toward himself.
Socrates: both the subject and
object of his own search for knowledge, applying the dictum, “Know thyself.”
Like Oedipus he gets expelled from the city. Yet Foucault wants Plato,
Socrates, and Aristotle to be on the side of disinterested knowledge.
Disinterestedness: subject standing back from power or knowledge of the
disempowered (slave morality). No passion, disconnected from power.
Oedipus has power to put things in
order – he exercises power in knowing (not just because he owns the town,
because power is not a capacity for Foucault). He’s so good at it that he
undermines himself. He went too far. In the context of the play, he’s always
already operating under the Olympian order in some way, but at the end his
power is completely taken away from it, he’s stripped of it. It doesn’t matter
he follows his own original rule (blind himself and exile himself), because
Creon asks him to wait for the Gods’ decree.
The disinterested knowledge here
anticipates Plato and Aristotle. March 17 1971 Lecture (pg 197). Is
Aristotelian knowledge sufficiently close to seer knowledge?
Power/knowledge is thrown out as a
pair, excluded. “We can learn by inquiring” – the play says: oh you better not
know that way. Because that way is bound up with power. Disinterested knowledge
(Aristotle) since it keeps its distance with power is okay, permissible. 2
possible readings: 1) Move from power/knowledge to disinterested knowledge is a
move of power. (more metaphysical reading, more Nietzschean) Pg 155: “The
semantic field cuts itself off as institution, as social break: philosophy,
science, the discourse of truth [are]: independent of power, founders of power,
critics of power. But it was in fact organized on the basis of power.” 2) Let’s
grant that there is something like disinterested knowledge and do a genealogy
of how that comes about. That knowledge bears the history of struggle with
other forms of knowledge that explicitly affirm power. What are the conditions
of possibility that knowledge is totally disarticulated from power? Not
exercise of power, but exercise of knowledge bound up with power.
It’s not like after Oedipus
knowledge was no longer related to power. There is still power at work. There
is no basis, no ground, but knowledge is always produced in its interplay with
power. Which doesn’t make them any less true. There is power operating there
but that does not make it untrue. Power is not oppressive.
Chronologically: Written around the
same time as Socrates and Plato are running around. 30 years before Socrates
was executed. For Nietzsche, Sophocles represents pre-disinterested knowledge.
Homer’s contest – Nietzsche: old
Homeric form of truth & it was lost through Socrates.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)