These lectures are particularly interesting in relation to Foucault’s other work because of their historical proximity to the present. While his previous lectures focused primarily on the 17th–19th century, Naissance de la biopolitique deals with the emergence of liberalism from the 18th–20th century. But what was Foucault’s interest and motivation in writing on the concept of liberalism and political economy, two themes largely absent from his previous work? How critical was he toward liberalism? In Naissance de la biopolitique the lack of a normative position (for or against) may leave one guessing. While some have argued that these works marked a politically conservative turn in Foucault’s work, others argue that his personal investment in liberalism is perhaps irrelevant to what might be done with his work.
But what is it that these recent lectures contribute to the contemporary literature on the problem of Sovereignty and Political Economy? In particular what is their relationship to the work of Derrida and Agamben (both aware, and in the case of Agamben, clearly indebted to Foucault’s lectures). While some in the collabratory see a parallel between Foucault’s opening description of raison d’État and its structural exclusion/exteriority of law, others see this as a phase of analysis left behind in Foucault’s work (after the 16th century) in favor of a new analysis of political economy that focuses instead on the internal auto-limitation of government itself (in the 17th and 18th centuries). Is there is a parallel in Agamben’s work for this concept as well.? Why then does Agamben rarely, if ever, talk of political economy?
Foucault begins his lectures by locating a historical shift in the 16th century when jurisdiction begins to curtail the power of the sovereign rather than support it.
Legal theory and judicial institutions no longer serve as the multiplier, but rather as the subtractor of royal power. Thus, from the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century we see the development of a series of problems, polemics, and battles around, for example, fundamental laws of the realm that jurists argue, against raison d’État, cannot be called into question by governmental practice or raison d’État. (NB 10/BB 8)
Methodologically however, what are we to think of Foucault’s seeming rejection of studying the “real” arts of government?
I have not studied and do not want to study the development of real governmental practice by
determining the particular situations it deals with, the problems raised, the tactics chosen, the instruments employed, forged, or remodeled, and so forth. (NB 4/BB 2)
How are we to square this with what he then says on the next page? “I would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices” (NB 5/BB 3). “je voudrais partir de ces pratiques concrètes et passer en quelque sorte les universaux à la grille de ces pratiques.”
While this is not entirely clear, Foucault does clearly begin with an analysis of liberalism from a fairly non-traditional starting point: one not based on individual freedom, law, natural right, divine right, the work of Locke perhaps, etc. but rather upon the emergence of a new form of rationality immanent to government itself (la rationalisation de la pratique gouvernementale dans l'exercice de la souveraineté politique) (NB 4).
So lets examine more closely how this “autolimation” works on pages 12–14 in NB and pages 10-12 in BB. The birth of this new ratio of governmental practice, according to Foucault has five characteristics.
(1) Autolimitation is firstly de facto (de fait) in the sense that internal limitation is not a question jurisdiction or legal externalities (human rights, natural law, God, etc.). Internal limitation is not a question of the legal legitimacy or illegitimacy of any given action, rather its a question optimization. A government that fails to do the proper thing is not illegitimate, it is just clumsy (maladroit). The French word adroit means “clever” but like the word droit or “right” also comes from the Latin root dirigere “to direct.” Thus the failure of autolimitation is not an illegitimacy but rather literal matter of misdirection.
(2) Autolimitation is secondly de facto and general. “whatever happens, follows a relatively uniform line in terms of principles valid at all times and in all circumstances.” “...est générale, c'est-à-dire qui, en tout état de cause, suit un tracé relativement uniforme en fonction de principes qui sont toujours valables à travers toutes les circonstances.” (NB 13/ BB 11). What exactly are these general principles? Democracy? Laws of political economy? Budgets? Perhaps Keynes’ economic theory would be such a general be de facto principle.
(3) Autolimitation is thirdly de facto, general, and directed toward governmental objectives. The government must draw on a general de facto principle but also calculate its deployment regarding its own immanent objectives.
(4) Autolimitation is fourthly de facto, general, directed toward governmental objectives, and distinguishes between what must be done and what is advisable not to do. “un partage entre ce qu'il faut faire et ce qu'il convient de ne pas faire.” (NB 13/ BB 11). That is, autolimitation is not about taking individual liberty into account as an external principle, but rather as a factor among many others including money, resources, etc. How much will this cost, how much effort will this take? Not, “should we preserve the unalienable “rights of man” or not?” Limitation is not a matter of individual citizens imposing restraints on governmental practice.
(5) Autolimitation is fifthly de facto, general, directed toward governmental objectives, distinguishes between what must be done and what is advisable not to do, but finally, not decided by those in power “and full sovereign reason.” Rather the determination of an autolimitation is the result of a vast process of transaction (action) between a multiplicity of heterogenous components (power). “transaction, au sens très large du mot « transaction », c'est-à-dire « action entre », c'est-à-dire par toute une série de conflits, d'accords, de discussions, de concessions réciproques” (NB 14/ BB 12).
But perhaps before moving on to the next lecture it would also be important to look at the five characteristics of political economy in particular as an autolimitative set of practices...
